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Confronting The Consolidation Conundrum 
Richard L.   arc us* 
"Rule Forty-two. All persons more than a mile high to 
leave the court." 
"I'm not a mile high," said Alice. 
'You are," said the King. 
"Nearly two miles high," added the Queen. 
'Well, I shan't go, at any rate," said Alice; 'besides, that's 
not a regular rule; you've invented it just now." 
"It's the oldest rule in the book," said the King. 
"Then it ought to be Number One," said Alice.' 
Perhaps Rule 42 of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure-dealing with consolidation of cases and severance 
of issues for trialshould be number one. At least it has 
become considerably more important in recent years as courts 
have increasingly sought to use the power to consolidate and 
sever to design cures for the stresses of modern multiple 
l i t igat i~n.~ There can be no doubt that the American Law 
Institute's Complex Litigation Project has thrust consolidation 
* Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of the Law. I 
was a member of the Members' Consultative Group of the American Law Institute 
that commented on the ALI Complex Litigation Project. I was also Associate 
Reporter to the Federal Courts Study Committee, whose recommendations 
regarding consolidation are discussed in this Article. See infra text accompanying 
notes 88-89. The views expressed in this Article are mine alone. I would like to 
thank Ed Brunet, Mary Kay Kane, Tom Rowe and Joan Steinman who read a 
draft of this Article and offered comments. I am indebted for research assistance to 
Sarah Colby and Hasan Shafiqullah, members of the Hastings class of 1997. 
1. LEWIS CARROLL, ALICE IN WONDERLAND 132 (1986). 
2. "Due largely to caseload pressures, the federal courts are consolidating 
increasing numbers of cases . . . ." Joan Steinman, The Effects of Case 
Consolidation on the Procedural Rights of Litigants: What They Are, What They 
Might Be, Part I: Justiciability and Jurisdiction (Original and Appellate), 42 UCLA 
L. REV. 717, 718 (1995). Unfortunately, exact figures are not available. "[Tlhe 
Administrative Office of the United States Courts has not gathered statistics on 
the number of cases consolidated pursuant to [Rule 421." Id. a t  718 n.1. 
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center stage. Although it canvassed a variety of procedural 
devices for dealing with the challenges of complex litigation, 
including party joinder under Rules 19 and 20,~ intervention 
pursuant to Rule 24: class actions: interpleader: and 
bankruptcy,? the Project's principal thrust was to remove 
obstacles to consolidation. 
For the ALI Project, consolidation is Rule 1, although it is 
hard to predict the impact of the Project's proposals on the law. 
The Project has already been criticized by academics for trying 
to do too much and for failing to do enough. One professor has 
lambasted it because it "fails to deal in a holistic fashion with 
the interrelated consequences of complex cases," thus leaving 
too much ~ n d o n e . ~  Another reacts that the framers of the 
Project sought to "use the occasion of complex litigation reform 
to overhaul as much of the law of American civil procedure as 
possible," and describes a number of the Project's proposals as 
"sweeping7' and "radi~al."~ 
Under these circumstances, the prospects for quick 
adoption by Congress of the Project's statutory proposals 
appear small. Indeed, much less ambitious statutory initiatives 
have been introduced in Congress, but have not been 
adopted.'' Logically, if not politically, a central concern for 
Congress should be the Project's treatment of consolidation; 
unless consolidation is suited to the task of harnessing complex 
litigation, there would seem to be little reason to embrace other 
procedural reforms-be they aggressive or incomplete-to 
increase opportunities for consolidation. 
3. See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, COMPLEX LITIGATION: STATUTORY 
RECOMMENDATIONS AND ANALYSIS 24-26 (1994) [hereinafter COMPLEX LITIGATION 
PROPOSAL]. 
4. See id. at  26-27. 
5. See id. at  27-34. 
6. See id. a t  34-35. 
7. See id. a t  35-36. 
8. Linda S. Mullinex, Unfinished Symphony: The Complex Litigation Project 
Rests, 54 LA. L. REV. 977, 979 (1994). 
9. Gene R. Shreve, Reform Aspirations of the Complex Litigation Project, 54 
LA. L. REV. 1139, 1143-44 (1994). 
10. See H.R. 3406, lOlst Cong., 1st Sess. (1989); H.R. 4807, 100th Cong., 2d 
Sess. (1988); H.R. 3152, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987); H.R. 4315, 99th Cong., 2d 
Sess. (1986); H.R. 3690, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983). H.R. 3406 passed the House 
of Representatives without opposition, but the Senate did not act on it. For a 
review of the legislative process of these proposals, including analysis of the fate of 
H.R. 3406 and attention to the role of academic commentary, see Charles G. Geyh, 
Complex-Litigation Reform and the Legislative Process, 10 REV. LITIG. 401 (1991). 
THE CONSOLIDATION CONUNDRUM 
This Article therefore focuses on consolidation itself, 
emphasizing the use of consolidation for combined disposition, 
which is a principal objective of the Project." The Article builds 
on Professor Steinman's recent and very substantial work on 
the implications of consolidation and examines the standards 
and methods for deciding whether cases should be consolidated, 
a topic which she did not address.12 As Professor Steinman's 
work has revealed, consolidation presents a conundrum which 
surfaces in a number of jurisdictional and jurisdiction-related 
procedural puzzles. Whether consolidation should be employed 
in complex litigation seems the central question, but it has 
been little examined in the literature. The Complex Litigation 
Project provides a careful examination of the propriety and 
methods of consolidation. Evaluating the adequacy of this 
treatment thus provides the means through which this Article 
11. Consolidation pursuant to Rule 42 can be solely for pretrial purposes and, 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. $ 1407 (1988), transfer and consolidation are supposed to be 
limited to such purposes. The reality, however, is that consolidation that is initially 
designated "pretrial" is often never unscrambled because there is a global 
settlement, because the consolidated cases are resolved by pretrial motion, or 
because the cases are later formally consolidated for trial. For a thorough 
exploration of these realities and their ramifications, see Steinman, supra note 2. 
Whatever the present reality, it is evident that the thrust of the ALI Project is 
to facilitate consolidation for disposition of the actions, whether by settlement, 
pretrial ruling, or trial. A by-product of this effort may be severance of cases into 
constituent parts, such as liability and damages, and resolution of only some issues 
on a consolidated basis. See infra text accompanying notes 68-83, 177-206. But that 
does not change the basic thrust toward consolidated resolution. Some are quite 
overt about this objective: 
As somebody who has been involved in these mass torts over the last 
twelve years on a regular basis, I want to make an additional point. 
What is the single most important feature of these mass torts in terms of 
getting them resolved? What ultimate issue holds the key to the 
resolution of these claims in an efficient way? The answer is aggregation. 
Aggregation. You must get all of the cases in one forum. Until you do 
that, any piecemeal solution, however beneficial it may be, does not offer 
either the plaintiff or the defendant global peace. 
Kenneth R. Feinberg, Response to Deborah Hensler, A Glass Half Full, a Glass 
Half Empty: The Use of Alternative Dispute Resolution in Mass Personal Injury 
Litigation, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1647, 1648 (1995). 
Consolidation for trial or other resolution is therefore the focus of this Article. 
Accordingly, the cautions about consolidation in this Article may not apply to 
coordinating discovery to avoid duplication of effort. 
12. See Steinman, supra note 2, a t  720 & n.10; see also Joan Steinman, The 
Effects of Case Consolidation on the Procedural Rights of Litigants: What They Are, 
What They Might Be, Part I t  Non-Jurisdictional Matters, 42 UCLA L. REV. 967 
(1995). 
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will address the question whether consolidation should be used 
in complex litigation. 
To put the question in context, the Article begins in Part I1 
with a review of the evolution of consolidation, stressing its 
increasing importance. Part I11 identifies the sometimes 
troubling implications consolidation has for the parties and the 
court, finding reason for the Federal Courts Study Committee's 
1990 call for more detailed guidelines for the use of this 
technique. Part N then forms the heart of the analysis by 
examining the Project's treatment of consolidation criteria, 
concluding that the Project impressively illuminates the issues 
but should be fortified by adoption of standards for 
consolidation that fully parallel those for common question 
class actions. Part IV also evaluates both the Project's reliance 
on a newly created Complex Litigation Panel to make the 
initial decision whether to consolidate, and its propulsion 
toward fragmenting cases by severance. Finally, Part IV 
reflects on the questions that will be before Congress should 
the Project's proposals be introduced there. The Article then 
turns in Part V to brief reflections on ways the Project's 
treatment of consolidation could be employed by courts under 
current statutory arrangements. It concludes with the hope 
that the Project's work on consolidation will be used by courts 
even if the proposal's menu of jurisdictional and choice of law 
changes fostering consolidation languishes unenacted. 
Consolidation has been around for a long time. Introduced 
in England in the eighteenth century by Lord Mansfield,13 it 
was first authorized in the federal courts in this country by a 
statute adopted in 1813.14 According to Professor Meador, 
13. See Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hillmon, 145 U.S. 285, 292 (1892) (explaining 
that Lord Mansfield introduced the consolidation rule to "avoid the expense and 
delay attending the trial of a multiplicity of actions upon the same question"). 
14. Act of July 22, 1813 5 3, 3 Stat. ch. 14. The statute provided in pertinent 
part: 
Whenever causes of like nature, or relative to the same question shall 
be pending before a court of the United States or of the territories 
thereof, it shall be lawful for the court to make such orders and rules 
concerning proceedings therein as may be conformable to the principles 
and usages belonging to courts for avoiding unnecessary costs or delay in 
the administration of justice, and accordingly causes may be consolidated 
as to the court shall appear reasonable. 
THE CONSOLIDATION CONUNDRUM 
consolidation for trial was "[olne of the earliest examples of 
case management based on inherent authority," and it was 
viewed in American jurisprudence as "an inseparable aspect of 
the powers possessed by common-law and equity ~ourts."'~ 
Mindful of the risks of comparing joinder attitudes of the 
19th century with those of the present,16 one can comfortably 
conclude that consolidation initially served largely as an 
antidote to strict limitations on joinder that precluded 
combination in a single suit even of closely related claims. One 
example is the Supreme Court's 1892 decision in Mutual Life 
Insurance Co. v. Hillmon," a case familiar to generations of 
law students for its rule on hearsay evidence,18 which involved 
separate suits against three insurance companies based on 
separate life insurance policies issued on the life of the same 
man.lg Each insurance company denied that the man was dead, 
and the trial court consolidated the three cases for trial of that 
question even though plaintiff could not have joined all 
companies in a single suit under prevailing joinder rules.20 
Under current joinder notions, of course, the combination of 
these three claims in a single lawsuit would be unexceptional. 
Defendants contended on appeal that the combination of the 
cases was improper because the actions did not relate to the 
same question, but the Court refused to interfere with the trial 
judge's conclusion that a combined trial would avoid 
unnecessary delay and expense.21 In a 1933 case, the Court 
This statute, and its successors, remained on the books until 1948, although 
effectively superseded by Rule 42 in 1938. See Gregory R. Harris, Note, 
Consolidation and Transfer in the Federal Courts: 28 U.S.C. Section 1407 Viewed 
in Light of Rule 42(a) and Section 1404(a), 22 HASTINGS L.J. 1289, 1290 n.6 
(1971). 
15. Daniel J. Meador, Inherent Judicial Authority in the Conduct of Civil 
Litigation, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1805, 1807 (1995). 
16. See generally Robert Bone, Mapping the Boundaries of a Dispute: 
Conceptions of Ideal Lawsuit Structure from the Field Code to the Federal Rules, 89 
COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1989) (cautioning against the assumption that 19th century 
proceduralists embraced the same attitude toward joinder as the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure). 
17. 145 US. 285 (1892). 
18. Hillmon probably appears as a principal case in every American evidence 
casebook. When the Federal Rules of Evidence were adopted in 1974, it was so 
widely recognized that the Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 803(3) satisfied 
themselves with the comment that "[tlhe rule of Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hillmon 
allowing evidence of intention as tending to prove the doing of the act intended, is, 
of course, left undisturbed." FED. R. EVID. 803(3) advisory committee's note. 
19. Hillmon, 145 U.S. a t  285-86. 
20. Id. at  286. 
21. Id. at  289-92. The Court went on to reverse the judgment for plaintiff 
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added that "consolidation is permitted as a matter of 
convenience and economy in admini~tration."~~ 
Rule 42 carried forward this flexible approach to joinder, 
building in part on experience in some state court systems.23 
Rule 42 is said to go beyond even the broad initial party joinder 
opportunities afforded by Rule 2 0 . ~ ~  The courts, however, have 
sometimes been circumspect in taking advantage of Rule 42's 
potentially wide scope of  omb bin at ion.^^ For some time, 
due to the trial judge's limitation on defendant's peremptory challenges, and then 
volunteered its answer to the evidence question that has transfixed evidence 
scholars by holding that the insurance companies should be allowed to offer letters 
written by another man in support of their claim that the dead body that had 
been found was really his. The letters indicated that their author intended to 
accompany plaintiff's alleged decedent on the trip that allegedly led to his death. 
Plaintiff had objected to introduction of these letters on hearsay grounds, but the 
Court held that they could nevertheless be admitted to prove that the author acted 
as the letters said he intended to act. Id. a t  295-300. 
22. Johnson v. Manhattan Ry., 289 U.S. 479, 496 (1933). In Johnson, the 
Court said that the consolidation of cases does not "merge the suits into a single 
cause." Id. at  496-97; see also Steinman, supra notes 2 and 12 (discussing these 
issues in more detail). The statement caused much uncertainty that remains 
unresolved. 
In reality, the situation in Johnson was so peculiar that it does not seem to 
justify generalization. The problem in Johnson seems to have developed from a 
disagreement between Judge Martin Manton of the Second Circuit and the judges 
of the Southern District of New York about which trust company to appoint in 
receivership situations. Relying on a statute that allowed the senior circuit judge to 
assign a judge to serve on a district court, Judge Manton assigned himself to sit 
on the district court, had an action involving the Manhattan Railway Co. filed 
before him, and promptly appointed a trustee. Johnson later filed a second action, 
which was assigned to a district judge in the normal course. The district judge 
appointed a different trustee and invalidated Judge Manton's order of appointment, 
declaring that he was consolidating the two cases. The Supreme Court held the 
district judge's order invalid because the district judge did not acquire authority 
over Judge Manton's case by declaring it consolidated with the case the judge was 
presiding over. The basic difficulty was thus a problem of case assignment, not 
consolidation; had Judge Manton's case been assigned to the district judge he could 
have revoked the earlier order whether or not the two cases were consolidated. 
23. See FED. R. CIV. P. 42 advisory committee's notes (stating that the rule's 
provisions are comparable to those adopted in Arkansas, California, New Mexico, 
and New York). 
24. "[Ilt would be a mistake to assume that the standard for consolidation is 
the same as that governing the original joinder of parties or claims." 9 CHARLES A. 
WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE 5 2382, a t  432 
(2d ed. 1994). 
25. For example, in Clark v. Elgin, 25 F.R.D. 248 (N.D. Ohio 1960), four 
suits arising from a single auto accident were consolidated, but the court declined 
to combine them with a fifth arising out of the same accident because it involved 
an issue of contributory negligence. Under Rule 20, joinder of these claims in a 
single suit would of course have been permissible since all arose out of the same 
occurrence. 
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consolidation was only a sporadic event, and not a device the 
courts viewed as useful in combating caseload pressures. Thus, 
when conferences were convened in the 1950s to examine ways 
to deal with protracted l i t i g a t i ~ n , ~ ~  no substantial consideration 
was given to consolidation as such a technique. But the 
problem of the repetitious suit was not far off. 
By the 1960s consolidation began to play a more prominent 
role in some types of cases. Confronted with some 2,000 private 
actions nationwide resulting from the electrical equipment 
price-fixing conspiracy, Chief Justice Warren appointed an ad 
hoc committee of judges to provide consistent treatment of 
discovery in these cases. Although not precisely consolidation, 
this was a move in that direction. The experience was 
sufficiently successful to prompt Congress in 1968 to create the 
Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation. Congress granted the 
panel newly created authority to transfer cases pending in a 
variety of federal courts for coordinated or consolidated pretrial 
treatment .27 
Within a few years, it became widely recognized that even 
though this type of transfer was supposed to be limited to 
pretrial handling of cases, it usually shifted final responsibility 
for the cases to the court presiding over the consolidated 
proceedings, in part because transferee judges frequently used 
28 U.S.C. 5 1404(a) to obtain authority to transfer for all 
purposes, including Widespread use of transfer 
provisions thus paved the way for consolidated treatment of 
significant numbers of antitrust and securities fraud suits. 
It has been in tort litigation, however, that consolidation 
has played its most prominent role in recent years. As early as 
1963, a prescient student comment focused on the role of 
26. See Proceedings of the Seminar on Protracted Cases for United States 
Circuit and District Judges Held at N.Y.U. Law Center, Aug. 26-30, 1957, 21 
F.R.D. 395; Proceedings on the Seminar on Protracted Cases for United States 
Ju&es Held at Stan. L. Sch., Aug. 25-30, 1958, 23 F.R.D. 319. 
27. 28 U.S.C. 8 1407(a). 
28. John F. Cooney, Comment, The Experience of Transferee Courts Under the 
Multidistrict Litigation Act, 39 U. CHI. L. REV. 588, 589 (1972) ("[Tlransfer for the 
limited purpose of pretrial proceedings has become functionally equivalent to 
transfer for all purposes, including trial on substantive legal issues."). This does 
not mean that transfer for pretrial purposes could not have such effects absent a 
later follow-up transfer under 8 1404(a). Section 1407 only requires re-transfer for 
trial, and most cases (including those transferred pursuant to !j 1407) don't reach 
trial. Thus, many cases would be concluded by settlement or dispositive pretrial 
motions after a 8 1407 transfer even without the subsequent 8 1404(a) transfer. 
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consolidation in mass tort cases.29 Under the Multidistrict 
Litigation Act, transfer and consolidation were often used in 
mass disaster cases arising out of airplane crashes and hotel 
fires, and these techniques have also become popular in more 
dispersed tort cases involving exposure to allegedly toxic 
substances. The popularity of transfer and consolidation in 
mass tort cases has, in part, been due to the siege mentality 
that has gained currency in the judiciary." As judges chafed a t  
some of the prerequisites and limitations of class actions in 
mass tort the consolidation avenue became more 
a t t r a ~ t i v e . ~ ~  For example, District Judge Robert Parker of 
Texas, who had a large docket of asbestos cases, experimented 
with both consolidation and class action treatment in handling 
this docket. Eventually, as reported by Professor Mullenix, he 
became "indifferent as to whether to conduct [his pending 
asbestos cases] as a Rule 42 consolidation or as a Rule 23 class 
action."33 Probably the most aggressive use of the 
29. Comment, Consolidation in Mass Tort Litigation, 30 U. CHI. L. REV. 373 
(1963). 
30. See Samuel Issacharoff, Administering Damage Awards in Mass-Tort 
Litigation, 10 REV. LITIG. 463, 493 (1991) (referring to "the mass-tort litigation that 
has placed the courts under siege"). 
31. See generally Richard L. Marcus, They Can't Do That, Can They? Tort 
Reform Via Rule 23, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 858 (1995). 
32. Mining the interaction between class actions and consolidations, courts 
can use consolidation to capture the claims of class members who opt out of Rule 
23(b)(3) class actions. See, e.g., In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litigation, 659 
F.2d 1341, 1349 (5th Cir. 1981) ("The district judge . . . was, and perhaps still is, 
contemplating consolidation of all the opt-out cases for trial . . . ."); Lailhengue v. 
Mobil Oil Corp., 775 F. Supp. 908, 914 n.8 (E.D. La. 1991) ("Any opt-out plaintiffs 
would be consolidated with the class under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 
42(a) for trial on punitive damages."); Eastern Brewing Corp. v. Owens-Illinois, 
Inc., 1989 WL 158752 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (class action and four similar actions brought 
by opt-out plaintiffs consolidated); MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, SECOND, 
5 21.631 (1985) ("Class actions may be consolidated with cases instituted by opt- 
outs or others.") [hereinafter MANUAL, SECOND]; WILLIAM W SCHWARZER, MANAGING 
ANTITRUST AND OTHER COMPLEX LITIGATION 183 (1982) ("Individual actions 
ancillary to the class action should be managed so as to minimize duplication of 
activity. Consolidating them with the main action for pretrial and trial reduces 
such duplication of effort."). 
The MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, RIIRD, continues to recognize the power 
to consolidate the cases of opt-out plaintiffs, but cautions: 
Care should be taken in such situations to ensure that counsel for the 
parties in the nonclass actions are given a fair opportunity to participate 
in the presentation of evidence and arguments at  trial, particularly when 
their clients are particularly affected. 
MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, THIRD, 5 21.631 (1995) [hereinafter MANUAL, 
-1. 
33. Linda S. Mullenix, Beyond Consolidation: Postaggregative Procedure in 
8791 THE CONSOLIDATION CONUNDRUM 887 
consolidation power occurred in 1991, when the Multidistrict 
Litigation Panel transferred over 26,000 asbestos personal 
injury cases to a single district judge in hopes he could apply "a 
new, streamlined approach" to them.34 Recognizing the 
increased use of consolidation, Professor Resnik, in her 
comprehensive 1991 study of tendencies toward aggregation of 
litigation, concluded that "class actions are a visible but 
probably not dominant form of aggregati~n."~ 
Consolidation holds out a bland, somewhat technocratic, 
uncontroversial face to the world. Thus, as she worked on her 
study of procedural implications of consolidation, Professor 
Steinman was struck by the widespread belief of legal 
professionals that consolidation would not affect the rights of 
 litigant^.^^ But courts are beginning to notice that the reality of 
consolidation, particularly in mass tort cases, sometimes has 
very substantial effects on those rights. As the Second Circuit 
cautioned in upholding a consolidation order in 1992, "The 
systemic urge to aggregate litigation must not be allowed to 
trump our dedication to individual justice, and we must take 
care that each individual plaintiff's-and defendant's-cause 
Asbestos Mass Tort Litigation, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 475, 504 (1991); see also 
id. a t  489 (reporting that earlier Judge Parker had "believed he had reached the 
maximum consolidation feasible" with consolidated trials of 30 plaintiffs). 
34. In re Asbestos Prod. Liab. Litig. (No. VI), 771 F. Supp. 415, 418 (J.P.M.L. 
1991). The Panel had previously refused to transfer asbestos cases on the ground 
that they did not present common questions. In re Asbestos & Asbestos Insulation 
Material Prod. Liab. Litig., 431 F. Supp. 906 (J.P.M.L. 1977). In 1991, it explained 
that developments since 1977 promoted the difference in outcome: " W e  are 
persuaded that this litigation has reached a magnitude, not contemplated in the 
record before us in 1977, that threatens the administration of justice . . . ." 771 F. 
Supp. a t  418. Recognizing the potential drawbacks of consolidation, however, it 
assured claimants that the transfer would not "result in their actions entering 
some black hole, never to be seen again." Id. a t  423 n.10. 
35. Judith Resnik, From "Cases" to "Litigation", 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., 
Summer 1991, a t  5, 22; see also Charles Silver, Comparing Class Actions and 
Consolidations, 10 REV. LITIG. 495 (1991). 
36. As Professor Steinman explains: 
Even persons who are well educated in the law and have years of 
experience are largely oblivious to the effects of consolidation upon the 
procedural rights of litigants. The general belief seems to be that 
consolidation does not affect litigants' procedural rights. Invariably, when 
I told friends-law professors, practitioners, magistrate judges-what I 
was writing about, their response was, "Can you give me an example?" 
Steinman, supra note 2, at 721 all. 
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not be lost in the shadow of a towering mass litigation."? 
There is a price to be paid for the bounty of consolidation that 
needs to be taken into account. 
Recognizing these concerns, the appellate courts have not 
allowed district judges carte blanche to consolidate, even in 
mass tort cases. In 1993, for example, the Second Circuit 
overturned two efforts to consolidate mass tort claims. In one, 
it reversed a judgment for plaintiffs that resulted from a 
consolidated trial of 600 asbestos cases.38 The appellate court 
noted the "herculean task" of coping with mass torts and 
acknowledged that "[plre-trial consolidation for the purposes of 
discovery, the appointment of special masters to expedite the 
settlement, and, especially, the liberal use of consolidated trials 
have ameliorated what might otherwise be a sclerotic backlog 
of cases."39 Nevertheless, the court held that consolidation was 
an abuse of discretion, reasoning that the varied work histories 
of the plaintiffs had presented the jury with a "dizzying 
amount" of evidence and that the case was therefore 
distinguishable from the 1992 case quoted above, which upheld 
the judgment of a consolidated trial of asbestos claims for 
workers at a  hipy yard.^' One judge dissented, arguing that the 
majority's view "would likely compel the post-trial reversal of 
most large-scale consolidated trials of product liability claims" 
even though "[c]onsolidated trials are an indispensable means 
of resolving the thousands of asbestos claims flooding our state 
and federal courts, as well as claims arising from other types of 
mass torts."41 
37. In re Brooklyn Navy Yard Asbestos Litig., 971 F.2d 831, 853 (2d Cir. 
1992) (citations omitted). 
38. Malcolm v. National Gypsum Co., 995 F.2d 346, 348 (2d Cir. 1993). 
39. Id. at 350. 
40. Id. at 349, 353 (citing In re Brooklyn Navy Yard Asbestos Litig., 971 F.2d 
831 (2d Cir. 1992), quoted in text accompanying note 37 supra). In Malcolm, the 
Second Circuit said Brooklyn Navy Yard was different due to the similarity of 
experience of those workers because the employer there was the military, and 
"uniformity is a way of life with the military." Malcolm, 995 F.2d a t  353. 
41. Malcolm, 995 F.2d a t  354-55 Walker, J., dissenting). 
The Second Circuit is not oblivious to those concerns. Thus, in Consorti v. 
Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 64 F.3d 781, 785 (2d Cir. 19951, it emphasized that 
"[clonsolidation is a valuable and important tool of judicial administration," and 
that "without consolidation the courts are simply incapable of handling of such 
volume" as the 200,000 asbestosis cases filed in state and federal courts. The 
district judge there had consolidated four separate asbestosis claims for trial, and 
defendant appealed from the verdict in favor of one plaintiff on the ground that 
Malcom announced a "strong anti-consolidation bias." Citing the &I Project, id. at  
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In another 1993 case, the Second Circuit granted a writ of 
mandamus to overturn the consolidation of 44 cases involving 
repetitive stress injury (RSI) allegedly caused by various types 
of keyboard office equipment.42 The court emphasized that this 
alleged condition encompasses a wide variety of problems, that 
these problems may result from individual-specific conditions 
such as obesity and high blood cholesterol levels, and that the 
cases involved a wide variety of office equipment (from cash 
registers to computers).43 Moreover, the Judicial Panel on 
Multidistrict Litigation had earlier refused to consolidate all 
RSI cases on the ground that there was not sufficient 
commonality." The Second Circuit concluded that "the district 
court substituted a discussion of so-called mass torts for precise 
findings as to what are the 'common question[s] of law or fact' 
justifying consolidation pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 42.7'45 
These appellate setbacks for consolidation of mass tort 
cases emphasize the contemporary importance of consolidation, 
and also that consolidation can substantially affect the rights 
and interests of parties. Some of the impetus to submerge the 
individual features of claims results uniquely from 
consolidation, while other tendencies in this direction are only 
compounded by it. In any event, it is important to canvass the 
sorts of effects consolidation can produce to appreciate 
consolidation's impor tan~e .~~  
786, the court affirmed. It explained the outcome in Malcom as due to "factors 
unique to that case." Id. at  785. In particular, it turned out at  trial in Malcom 
that the district court was wrong in believing that all plaintiffs had spent most of 
their work history a t  power plant work sites, and there were also serious problems 
caused by the addition on the eve of trial of over 200 companies as third-party 
defendants. Id. at  786-87. Because the district judge in the case before it took 
pains to distinguish the various consolidated cases for the benefit of the jury, the 
court concluded that the combination might have improved the quality of the 
decision in the case. Id. 
42. In re Repetitive Stress Injury Litig., 11 F.3d 368 (2d Cir. 1993). 
43. Id. at  371, 373-74. 
44. In re Repetitive Stress Injury Prod. Liab. Litig., 1992 WL 403023 
(J.P.M.L. 1992). 
45. Repetitive Stress Injury, 11 F.3d a t  373 (alteration in original). 
46. For a similar examination, see William W Schwarzer et al., Judicial 
Federalism: A Proposal to Amend the Multidistrict Litigation Statute to Permit 
Discovery Coordination of Large-Scale Litigation Pending in State and Federal 
Courts, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1529, 1546-50 (1995). 
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A. Loss of Control 
Consolidation is not supposed to diminish a party's control 
over its case. Professor Moore's treatise thus continues to as- 
sure its readers that after consolidation "each party remains 
free to control its own case and conduct trial  procedure^."^^ 
But the reality is often otherwise, and even Professor Moore 
follows his assurance with a citation to a case that undermines 
that as~urance:~ A principal impetus behind this loss of control 
is the need to organize and discipline the numerous parties in a 
consolidated proceeding. As a New York state court recognized 
in 1899: 
[Tlhere can be but one master of a litigation on the side of the 
plaintiffs. It is also plain that it would be as easy to drive a 
span of horses pulling in diverging directions, as to conduct a 
litigation by separate, independent action of various plaintiffs, 
acting without concert, and with possible dis~ord.'~ 
To a substantial extent, this loss of control occurs without con- 
solidation when numerous parties are joined in a litigation, and 
the loss may be felt by both plaintiffs and defendants." 
Courts can and do take actions that magnify loss of control, 
however. The most important is appointment of lead counsel, 
47. 5 JAMES W. MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶ 42.02[5], a t  42-36-37 
to 42-37 (2d ed. 1995). 
48. Id. at 42-37, citing Farber v. Riker-Maxson Corp., 442 F.2d 457 (2d Cir. 
1971) (refusing to consider a motion for summary judgment filed by nonlead coun- 
sel). 
49. Manning v. Mercantile Trust Co., 57 N.Y.S. 467, 468 (1899). 
50. Thus, an experienced antitrust lawyer summarized the situation on the 
defense side of antitrust class actions as follows: 
Even where the court does not formally appoint liaison counsel or lead 
counsel, everything in an antitrust class action is handled by committee 
anyway. Those of you who have participated in meetings of counsel in 
such cases know that your experience in the courtroom does you precious 
little good; what you would need, ideally, is experience in a state legisla- 
ture. In fact, it is oRen the best trial lawyers who have the hardest time 
adapting to what have become the accepted procedures for handling anti- 
trust class actions. A good trial lawyer's tenacious pursuit of his own 
theory of the case and his unwillingness to compromise his client's inter- 
est in the slightest respect for the good of the majority are almost irnme- 
diately taken as signs of pigheadedness on the part of his fellow counsel. 
The result is that he is quickly ostracized from the decision-making inner 
circle of lawyers on his side of the case, thereby further diminishing his 
ability to influence the course of the proceedings. 
Dando Cellini, An Overview of Antitrust Class Actions, 49 ANTITRUST L.J. 1501, 
1505 (1980). 
8791 THE CONSOLIDATION CONUNDRUM 891 
which ordinarily involves circumscribing the latitude of other 
lawyers in the case." Courts have upheld orders that forbid 
nonlead counsel from filing motions or undertaking discovery 
without permission from lead counsel.52 Beyond appointment of 
lead counsel, the court may direct that the original pleadings 
be superseded by a consolidated complaint in order to avoid the 
confusion that would result from conducting combined litiga- 
tion with reference to a large number of pleadings. Such consol- 
idated complaints, typically drafted by a committee of lawyers, 
may have an "everything but the kitchen sink" air that dis- 
turbs defendants who find themselves confkonting new or ex- 
panded charges as a result of the rewriting.53 The consolidation 
of the complaint can be disturbing to plaintiffs as well, for it 
takes control over the content of the complaint away from the 
individual ~ l a i m a n t s . ~ ~  Although a court may allow dissenting 
plaintiffs to abjure certain claims,55 plaintiffs may be compelled 
51. The MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, THIRD includes a sample order 
designating lead counsel to determine the position of the plaintiffs on all matters 
arising in the cases, to coordinate the discovery, to conduct settlement negotiations, 
and to delegate responsibilities to other lawyers whom lead counsel is to "monitor." 
MANUAL, THIRD, supra note 32, 8 41.31. The MANUAL, SECOND, further urged that 
counsel seek accord, but added that if consensus could not be achieved, "and if a 
single position need not be taken by all members of the group, members may pro- 
ceed on that matter individually or by sub-groups." MANUAL, SECOND, supra note 
32, 5 20.222 (emphasis added). The MANUAL, THIRD, softens this provision, saying 
that if consensus is not achieved "members of the group may have to proceed on 
the matter individually or by subgroups." MANUAL, THIRD, supra note 32, 5 20.222. 
52. See Vincent v. Hughes Air West, Inc., 557 F.2d 759 (9th Cir. 1977); see 
also supra note 48. 
53. See, e.g., Katz v. Realty Equities Corp., 521 F.2d 1354, 1361 (2d Cir. 
1975) (noting that defendants who were "actors on the periphery" found themselves 
potentially facing expanded claims under consolidated complaint); Waldman v. 
Electrospace Corp., 68 F.R.D. 281, 284 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (finding that plaintiffs 
are more likely to add defendants in consolidated complaint); see also Diana E .  
Murphy, Unified and Consolidated Complaints in Multidistrict Litigation, 132 
F.R.D. 597, 598 (1991) ("Despite the procedural label, a decision regarding the use 
of a unified or consolidated complaint may well have implications for other aspects 
of the case, such as class certification and choice of law questions."). 
54. As Judge Murphy noted in her article on consolidated complaints: 
Plaintiffs traditionally seek to maintain the maximum degree of control 
over their cases, and multidistrict cases produce more than the usual 
amount of tension among counsel regarding case management issues. . . . 
[A] court order requiring the filing of a unified complaint, even one limit- 
ed to pretrial proceedings, may be viewed by counsel as an intrusion on 
their right to conduct their case as they see fit. 
Murphy, supra note 53, a t  601-02. See also Steinman, supra note 12, a t  973-76. 
55. See In re Storage Tech. Corp. Sec. Litig., 630 F. Supp. 1072, 1074 (D. 
Colo. 1986). 
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to pursue claims they prefer not to assert? Assurances that 
the various cases will be unbundled for trial and the original 
complaints reinstated5? seem inherently unreliable since discov- 
ery, decisions on motions, and other pretrial orders all focus on 
the consolidated complaint. 
In sum, as others have noted, consolidation can leave 
claimants with as little control over their cases as unnamed 
class members in a class action.58 Of course, the loss of control 
may be viewed as a matter of only moderate concern depending 
on the size and nature of the claims involved. With personal 
injury claims, however, there is a deep tradition of individual 
autonomy.59 But even in personal injury claims, empirical re- 
search suggests that tort claimants often do not have a strong 
sense of control over the cases when handled in the normal 
manneq6' and opposition to combined treatment may be due 
more to the reaction of lawyers than to that of parties?' In- 
deed, although it seems undeniable that claimants like person- 
al involvement in their cases, it may be that alternatives to 
traditional litigation could offer more promise of actual involve- 
ment for most  claimant^.^^ 
56. See In re Wirebound Boxes Antitrust Litig., 128 F.R.D. 262, 264-65 (D. 
Minn. 1989) (including additional defendants in consolidated complaint over objec- 
tion of some plaintiffs). But cf. Garber v. Randell, 477 F.2d 711, 716 (2d Cir. 1973) 
(holding that consolidated complaint including law firm as a defendant is inappro- 
priate because all plaintiffs but one disavowed claim against law firm and that one 
plaintiff appeared to lack standing to sue firm). 
57. In Katz v. Realty Equities Corp., 521 F.2d 1354 (2d Cir. 1975), the dis- 
trict judge said that the use of a consolidated complaint during pretrial "could be 
without prejudice to unfurling the separate flags a t  trial." Id. a t  1358. 
58. See, e.g., Roger H. Trangsrud, Joinder Alternatives in Mass Tort Litiga- 
tion, 70 CORNELL . REV. 779, 816-24 (1985); Joan Steinman, Reverse Removal, 78 
IOWA L. REV. 1029, 1042 (1993) ("[Alfter consolidation, the procedural safeguards 
that due process and codified rules demand in class actions of similar magnitude 
often do not counterbalance the litigant's loss of control."); cf. Silver, supra note 35, 
a t  497-98 (arguing that consolidations are unlike class actions because they are not 
representational actions, and "[plarties and lawyers who stand a t  the head of a 
consolidation lead not as a dictator leads a people, but as an explorer leads a 
group of settlers into a new land-by going first"). 
59. See Roger H. Trangsrud, Mass Trials in Mass Tort Cases: A Dissent, 1989 
U. ILL. L. REV. 69, 70-76. 
60. See Deborah R. Hensler, Resolving Mass Toxic Torts: Myths and Realities, 
1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 89. 
61. Cf. Spencer Williams, Mass Tort Class Actions: Going, Going, Gone? 98 
F.R.D. 323, 329-30 (1983) (criticizing plaintiff lawyers' opposition to class certifica- 
tion in mass tort cases as self-interested). 
62. See Hensler, supra note 60, a t  104 ("Faced with the realities of modern 
mass tort litigation, courts-and legal scholar-should be open to the possibility 
that expanding the use of formal aggregative procedures may provide more litigant 
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B. The Blending Effect 
Combining cases because of their similarities stresses the 
factors of similarity and can consequently deflect attention 
from features that distinguish cases from one another.63 One 
symptom of this blending effect is the tendency in multidistrict 
proceedings to defer discovery or other action on unique aspects 
of cases and instead to focus the consolidated proceedings on 
common issues.64 Natural and expedient though this may be, it 
also bespeaks a shift in emphasis that may prejudice parties on 
one side or the other, or both. 
From the defendants7 perspective, the concern is that indi- 
vidualized grounds of defense may be submerged or obscured 
due to preoccupation with common issues. The marginalization 
of individual defenses has been a frequent complaint in class 
actions, and has sometimes caused courts to rehse to allow 
class treatment? But other courts have solved such problems 
and facilitated class treatment by streamlining the application 
of substantive law to  shave away elements that would require 
consideration of individual circumstan~es.~~ Much as there may 
be good reason for such refinement in the grounds for liability, 
control over the litigation process, more opportunity for litigant participation in the 
process, and a better match between victims' losses and compensation in those 
cases."); see also E. ALLAN LIND ET AL., THE PERCEPTION OF JUSTICE: TORT 
LITIGANTS' VIEWS OF TRIAL, COURT-ANNEXED ARBITRATION AND JUDICIAL SETTLE- 
MENT CONFERENCES 79-80 (1989) (reporting that litigants surveyed preferred arbi- 
tration to court-promoted settlements because they felt more involved in the for- 
mer). 
63. "Courts' attempts to manage mass torts efficiently often further increase 
the commonality among mass tort claims." Deborah R. Hensler & Mark A. Peter- 
son, Understanding Mass Personal Injury Litigation: A Socio-Legal Analysis, 59 
BROOK. L. REV. 961, 967 (1993). 
64. See generally DAVID F. HERR, MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION $ 9.7.3 at  204-07 
(1986) (focusing on common discovery with special provision for individual issues). 
This orientation lies behind the effort to separate the common issues for initial 
decision that the Project seeks to promote. See COMPLEX LITIGATION PROPOSAL, su- 
pra note 3, 112-16. 
65. See, eg., Windham v. American Brands, Inc., 565 F.2d 59, 65-72 (4th Cir. 
1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 968 (1978) (holding that need for individualized proof 
of impact and damages doomed antitrust class action). 
66. See, eg., Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 
429 U.S. 816 (1976) (employing fraud on the market theory in a securities fraud 
class action to obviate individualized proof of reliance). Related but more difficult 
issues arise when state-law claims are within the supplemental jurisdiction of the 
court, and the court seeks to blend the provisions of the law of several states, or 
to focus on the law of a single state, to facilitate aggregated resolution of cases us- 
ing a class action or other procedural devices. For discussion of these problems, see 
COMPLEX LITIGATION PROPOSAL, supra note 3, a t  347-49. 
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it seems difficult to deny that a prime impetus for the shift has 
been the judicial desire to handle cases in gross. 
From the plaintiffs' perspective, the homogenizing effect of 
combined litigation is a mixed blessing, depending on the indi- 
vidual circumstances of a given plaintiff. There is already 
something of a shift toward the mean in individual litigation 
that leaves claimants with the largest and strongest claims 
receiving less complete compensation than those with small 
claims.67 Consolidation may accelerate this tendency, benefit- 
ting plaintiffs with weak claims, while harming plaintiffs with 
stronger claims. 
C. Magnifying the Urge to Sever Issues 
Although bifurcation is said to be a "wholly different" pro- 
cedure fkom cons~lidation,~~ it is not an accident that the two 
are combined in Rule 42. A court may find it desirable to sepa- 
rate issues for trial in order to expedite or simplify the resolu- 
tion of a case between two parties. Indeed, a 1987 survey of 
state and federal judges indicated that they "overwhelmingly" 
supported bifurcation of issues "in appropriate cases."69 But 
even in a case with only two parties, the task of segregating 
certain issues for separate trial may prove daunting.?' As Judge 
Posner recently put it, a district judge who orders bifurcation 
"must carve at  the joint."?' When separate cases are consoli- 
dated but still involve unique issues, the urge to consolidate 
and to extract the common issues for trial, deferring the others 
67. See Hensler, supra note 60, a t  100-03. To a substantial extent this 
batching may result from the practices of plaintiffs' counsel. At least in asbestos 
personal injury litigation, some plaintiff lawyers carry large "portfolios" of litigation 
and some seek what are called "inventory settlements" applying to large numbers 
of clients. See, e.g., Georgine v. Amchen Prod., Inc., 157 F.R.D. 246, 294 (E.D. Pa. 
1994). More generally, in mass tort litigation there have emerged two categories of 
attorneys known as the "wholesalers" and the "retailers," indentified by their pref- 
erence for either individual litigation or group resolution of claims. See RICHARD 
SOBOL, BENDING THE LAW: THE STORY OF THE DALKON SHIELD BANKRUPTCY 73 
(1991) (describing emergence of two groups of plaintiff lawyers representing women 
claiming injury due to Dalkon Shield). 
68. 9 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 24, 8 2381, a t  427. 
69. LOUIS HARRIS & ASSOC., INC., JUDGES' OPINIONS ON PROCEDURAL ISSUES 
58-65 (1987) (study NO. 87017). 
70. E.g., Symbolic Control, Inc. v. International Business Mach. Corp., 643 
F.2d 1339 (9th Cir. 1980) (reversing the judgment for the defendant in an antitrust 
case because the district court, as a result of its bifurcation order, improperly trun- 
cated the causation inquiry). 
71. In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1302 (7th Cir. 1995). 
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for later action, follows rather naturally. That practice may be 
troublesome, however, for at  least two related reasons.72 
The first can be called the sterile trial problem. The para- 
digm recent example was In re Bendectin Litigati~n,?~ in which 
the Sixth Circuit affirmed a defense verdict despite serious 
misgivings about the district court's order that the issues be 
trifurcated for trial. Owing to transfer by the Judicial Panel on 
Multidistrict Litigation and removal from state court, the dis- 
trict court had before it over 800 cases involving claims of over 
1,100 plaintiffs for birth defects allegedly resulting from expo- 
sure in utero to defendant's antinausea drug. To expedite the 
handling of these cases, the district court eventually trifurcated 
the issues, leading to an initial trial on the question of whether 
the drug is a proximate cause of birth defects.74 In addition, the 
district judge directed that all visibly deformed plaintiffs be 
excluded from the courtroom during the trial. The appellate 
court recognized that the judge's order "could possibly prevent 
the plaintiffs from exercising their right to present to the jury 
the full atmosphere of their cause of action, including the reali- 
ty of injury,"75 and that the severance created the risk that 
the trial would have "a sterile or laboratory a tm~sphere ."~~ Al- 
though it found this the "most troubling" aspect of the case, the 
appellate court affirmed because Rule 42 gives the district 
court "'virtually unlimited freedom to try the issues in what- 
ever way trial convenience  require^?"^ Moreover, it noted 
that individual trial of all these cases could have occupied 182 
district judges for a year.78 A concurring judge criticized the 
district judge's handling of the case, noting that "the typical 
procedure in litigation does not involve the splitting up of a 
case, element by element, and trying each point to the jury 
~eparately,"~~ but he found no prejudice in this case because 
72. For a more detailed examination of the arguments related to issue sepa- 
ration, see James A. Henderson et al., Optimal Issue Separation in Modern Prod- 
ucts Liability Litigation, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1653, 1675-94 (1995). 
73. 857 F.2d 290 (6th Cir. 1988). 
74. The plaintiffs had consented to be bound by Ohio law, thus eliminating 
the possibility that different legal rules would preclude presentation of a single, 
common issue. 
75. In re Bendectin Litig., 857 F.2d at 315. 
76. Id. (quoting In re Beverly Hills Fire Litig., 695 F.2d 207, 217 (6th Cir. 
1982)). 
77. Id. at 316 (quoting 9 CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & 
PROCEDURE 9 2387, at 278 (1st ed. 1971)). 
78. Id. 
79. Id. at 328 (Jones, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Judge 
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plaintiffs had presented no evidence of any link between the 
drug and birth defects?' The Anglo-American tradition has 
relied on a complete in-court trial in which the litigant may 
participate. As in Bendectin, consolidation and bifurcation may 
undermine that tradition. Separation of issues may also trun- 
cate the ability of a jury to assess the case.81 Thus, the sterile 
trial risk raises basic concerns. 
The urge to extract common issues also leads to a second 
concern-a pro-defendant shift in results. Thirty years ago it 
was reported that defendants in personal injury cases won 
forty-two percent of those cases in which liability and damages 
were tried together, but seventy-nine percent of those in which 
liability was tried separately.82 This difference might indicate 
Jones explained his concerns with the district judge's order regarding the manner 
of trial as follows: 
Although each distinct event involved the ingesting of the same drug, it 
is hard to believe that all eight hundred plus claims can be tied neatly 
into one package and satisfactorily resolved by the answering of one ques- 
tion, i.e., did Bendectin cause the relevant birth defects? In tying all of 
these claims together, an argument could certainly be made as to 
prejudice. That is, by not allowing the plaintiffs to present evidence as to 
how they were individually affected by the drug, [the court's order] could 
have resulted in prejudice to them in their attempt to establish the re- 
quired elements of their case. 
Id. at  327. 
80. Id. On the factual basis for the claims, see Joseph Sanders, The Bendectin 
Litigation: A Case Study in the Life Cycle of Mass Torts, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 301, 
347 (1992) ("The scientific community seems to have reached something close to a 
consensus concerning the drug. While no study can remove all residual uncertainty 
regarding Bendectin's safety, if the drug is a teratogen, it is a relatively mild 
one . . . ."I. 
81. See Kenneth S. Bordens & Irwin A. Horowitz, Mass Tort Civil Litigation: 
The Impact of Procedural Changes on Jury Decisions, 73 JUDICATURE 22 (1989). 
[Ulnitary trial juries do tend to . . . utilize all the trial evidence 
while deciding each individual trial issue. Indeed, the initial analysis of 
the deliberations indicate[s] that unitary trial juries often do not decide 
liability or causation until they hear evidence concerning damages. 
Juries in separated trials appear to employ other, perhaps less sophis- 
ticated, heuristics to decide the issues. These latter juries tend to use 
more extreme heuristics: corporatecapitalist versus the little guy; good 
guy versus bad guy rhetoric dominates these deliberations. The bifurcation 
of general causation in the separated trial condition produces greater 
disbelief about causation yielding fewer verdicts for the plaintiffs. It may 
be that only more extreme pro-plaintiff juries who appeal to the good 
guy-bad guy [sic] rhetoric remain in the separated trial condition to vote 
for the plaintiffs. 
Id. at  27. 
82. Maurice Rosenberg, Court Congestion: Status, Causes and Proposed Reme- 
dies, in HARRY W. JONES, THE COURTS, THE PUI~LIC, AND THE LAW EXPLOSION 48 
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that courts sever more often when the case for liability appears 
weak, but "when it is seen that the split trial reduces by more 
than half the cases in which personal injury plaintiffs are suc- 
cessful, it is apparent that bifurcation makes a substantial 
change in the nature of the jury trial itself."83 
D. Judicial Burden 
Finally, the assumption that consolidation invariably re- 
duces the burden on judges, though popular, seems open to 
question. Some proponents of broad consolidation seem to act 
as if the law of diminishing returns has been repealed. But the 
combination of cases may create an ungainly single litigation in 
place of a series of commonplace cases." Discovery incentives 
on both sides may be substantially altered by consolidation, as 
may the incentives to dispute other matters. A joint trial may 
be dispositive only if favorable to defendants, and otherwise 
lead to individualized further proceedings in which the results 
of the joint trial must be given effect. Thus, even the most 
forceful justification for consolidation-judicial economy-may, 
upon examination, prove to be an ambivalent one. 
E. The Need for Clearer Guidelines 
Over 60 years ago, Professor Chafee intoned that "[iln 
matters of justice, . . . the benefactor is he who makes one 
lawsuit grow where two grew before."85 More recently, howev- 
er, we have seen reasons for skepticism about consolidation of 
cases. The foregoing litany of concerns overstates the negative 
potential of consolidation, but does point up serious grounds for 
anxiety about when and how consolidation is ordered. Although 
some conclude that Rule 42 provides adequate guidance on 
those  question^,^^ the reality is that the sole direction in the 
(1965). 
83. 9 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 24, 8 2390, a t  508. 
84. Other procedural devices may produce similar overload problems. See 
Edward J. Brunet, A Study in the Allocation of Scarce Judicial Resources: The 
Eficiency of Federal Intervention Criteria, 12 GA. L. REV. 701, 710-20 (1978) (ex- 
ploring ways in which increased intervention may lower the quality of judicial 
action by overloading the courts). 
85. Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Bills of Peace With Multiple Parties, 45 HARV. L. 
REV. 1297, 1297 (1932). 
86. Harris, supra note 14, a t  1292 ("The criteria for granting consolidation set 
forth in rule 42(a) have been the subject of little controversy."); Gaylord A. Virden, 
Consolidation Under Rule 42 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: The US. 
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Rule is that the trial judge has broad discretion. That orienta- 
tion was certainly the view when Rule 42 was originally adopt- 
ed,87 but given the increased importance of consolidation and 
the attendant concerns sketched above, that orientation bears 
reexamination. Confronted with such concerns as those ad- 
dressed above,88 the Federal Courts Study Committee recom- 
mended in 1990 that either the Federal Rules of Civil Proce- 
dure or the Manual for Complex Litigation should include 
guidelines for consolidation and severan~e.~' Neither the newly 
minted Manual for Complex Litigation, Third, nor the Federal 
Rules incorporates such specifics,g0 but the ALI Project may be 
a substitute source for such g~idance.~' 
Rule 42 in Alice in Wonderland had the advantage of pro- 
viding a precise standard for its application-persons more 
than a mile high were banned from the court. Although there 
might be debates on whether the rule applied to a given per- 
son-witness Alice's protest that she is not a mile high-it did 
afford a relatively precise linear measure. The emphasis on 
discretion lying behind Rule 42 of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Courts of Appeals Disagree on Whether Consolidation Merges the Separate Cases 
and Whether the Cases Remain Separately Final for Purposes of Appeal, 141 F.R.D. 
169, 169 (1991) ("[Tlhe law in this area is now largely settled."). 
87. See, e.g., 18 FRANCIS A. DARNIEDER, HUGHES FEDERAL PRACTICE 255 
(1940) ("It is evident that the court must be given extensive discretionary powers 
in order to expedite a determination of the issues and avoid delay and inconve- 
nience."); ALEXANDER HOLTZOFF, NEW FEDERAL PROCEDURE AND THE COURTS 116 
(1940) ("In the interest of expediting and simplifying trials, the court is given 
broad authority, on the one hand, to consolidate cases for trial and, on the other 
hand, to order separation of different issues in the same case."); W.S. SMKINS, 
FEDERAL PRACTICE 70 (Alfred Schweppe ed. 1934) (Consolidation "is entirely within 
the discretionary power of the court."). 
88. See Memorandum fiom Richard L. Marcus to Workload Subcommittee, 
Federal Courts Study Committee re guidelines for consolidation and severance proce- 
dures (Oct. 16, 1989) in 1 FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE, WORKING PAPERS 
AND SUBCOMMITTEE REPORTS (1990) [hereinahr Marcus Memorandum]. This memo- 
randum raises several of the concerns mentioned in the text. 
89. REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY C O M M I ~ E  45 (April 2, 1990). 
90. The MANUAL, THIRD, supra note 32, 8 21.631, provides some general 
guidelines regarding consolidation, but it does not come close to the Project in its 
attention to the subject. 
91. It should be noted that the then-current draft of the COMPLEX LITIGATION 
PROPOSAL was brought to the attention of the Federal Courts Study Committee in 
connection with its recommendation. See Marcus Memorandum, supra note 88, a t  
10-12. 
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Procedure precludes similar precision, perhaps for good rea- 
son.92 The Multidistrict Litigation Act similarly lacks hard 
guidance.g3 But given the centrality of consolidation to the 
ALI Project, a more focused or confining regime seems in order. 
To put this point in context, it is worthwhile to catalogue 
the array of striking innovations the Project proposes in order 
to facilitate consolidation. It recommends substituting a Com- 
plex Litigation Panel for the current Judicial Panel on 
Multidistrict Litigation and vesting that body with authority to 
transfer cases pending in federal court for trial as well as for 
pretrial purposes.94 This sort of revision has already been pro- 
posed in C o n g r e ~ s . ~ ~  The Project goes beyond, however, and 
proposes authorizing the Panel to order the removal for con- 
solidated treatment of otherwise nonremovable cases pending 
in state court.96 It also prescribes controversial approaches to 
choice of law questions to remove the obstacles to consolidation 
that could result from having different substantive law apply to 
different cases.g7 To avoid disruption of the consolidated litiga- 
tion in the target court, the Project would additionally autho- 
rize the transferee court to enjoin "transactionally related pro- 
ceedings" in state and federal courtsg8 and to enter an order 
that invites nonparties to intervene and binds them by its 
determinations whether or not they accept the invitation." 
Moving further beyond current law, the Project would autho- 
rize the Panel to direct transfer of cases filed in federal court to 
a state transferee court under certain  circumstance^,'^^ and it 
92. Comment, supra note 29, at 381, states: 
It is neither possible nor desirable for courts to treat motions under 42(a) 
with the cold logic Alice displayed in dealing with Rule Forty-Two in 
Wonderland. What is required is a constant sensitivity to the equities of 
individual cases in conjunction with the experience courts have gained in 
handling juries and in administrating the cases on their dockets. 
Id. 
93. See HERR, supra note 64, $ 5.1, at 71 (stating $ 1407 criteria are merely 
thresholds, and the statute "is of limited value in determining whether transfer is 
appropriate in a particular case"). 
94. COMPLEX LITIGATION PROPOSAL, supra note 3, $ 3.02, at  62-70. 
95. See, e.g., H.R. 3406, lOlst Cong., 1st Sess. (1991). 
96. COMPLEX LITIGATION PROPOSAL, supra note 3, $$ 5.01-5.03, at  220-62. 
97. Id. $4 6.01-6.08, at  321-436. These sections have drawn the most fire from 
academic commentators. See, e.g., Linda S. Mullenix, Federalizing Choice of Law 
for Mass-Tort Litigation, 70 TEX. L. REV. 1623 (1992). 
98. COMPLEX LITIGATION PROPOSAL, supra note 3, 8 5.04 at  263-75. 
99. Id. $ 5.05, at 275-303. 
100. Id. $ 4.01, at  177-201. 
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recommends the adoption of an Interstate Complex Litigation 
Compact to effect concentration of cases in courts of different 
states. lol 
This is heady stuff. The proposed authority to shift cases 
properly filed in federal court to a state court, for example, 
"would create a system that differs in material respects from 
anything in our two centuries of constitutional and procedural 
history."lo2 Although the proposed interstate compact has a 
distant and thus-far unutilized actual analogy,lo3 it would also 
break new ground. Whether or not the Project's proposals 
would, if adopted, cause "a complete revolution in the way in 
which mass tort cases are decided today,"'" it is clear that 
the goal of the Project goes well beyond time-saving and fa- 
cilitation of litigation. Building on past experience with consoli- 
dation, the Project seeks very significantly to enhance the pow- 
er to consolidate by removing longstanding obstacles that pres- 
ently prevent or impede consolidation. 
It is certainly possible to assess the Project's proposals 
without focusing on whether increased consolidation itself is a 
good thing.lo5 The Project itself was based on a preliminary 
study that embraced an "intuition" that consolidation would 
provide important advantages.lo6 But as we have already seen, 
there can be real costs to cons~lidation.'~~ Before embracing 
these dramatic changes one would logically move beyond intu- 
ition and scrutinize the means adopted to avoid or minimize 
these costs. The Project basically seeks to channel the power to 
101. Id. 5 4.02, a t  201-16, app. B. 
102. Steinman, supra note 58, at  1038-39 (footnote omitted). 
103. In 1991, the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws endorsed a Uniform 
Transfer of Litigation Act, but it has yet to be used. For discussion of that propos- 
al, see Edward H. Cooper, Interstate Consolidation: A Comparison of the ALI Pro- 
ject With the Uniform Transfer of Litigation Act, 54 LA. L. REV. 897 (1994). 
104. Richard Epstein, The Consolidation of Complex Litigation: A Critical Eval- 
uation, 10 J.L. & COM. 1, 61-62 (1990). 
105. "Jurisdictional and transfer proposals to facilitate consolidation, then, can 
proceed from a relatively agnostic position about how worthy consolidated 
treatment is in various situations . . . ." Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Jurisdiction and 
Transfer Proposals for Complex Litigation, 10 REV. LITIG. 325, 326-27 (1991). 
106. Before it embarked on the actual Project, the ALI did a study of complex 
litigation that explained in its introduction that "[tlhis Preliminary Study is in- 
spired by the intuition that the common transaction, series of transactions, or 
course of conduct from which these complex cases arise should provide a basis for 
some form of consolidated or coordinated treatment of all of the resulting litiga- 
tion." AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRELIMINARY STUDY OF COMPLEX LITIGATION 5 
(1987). 
107. See supra text accompanying notes 47-84. 
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consolidate in two ways: by articulating a standard for consoli- 
dation and by delegating prime responsibility for the decision 
whether to consolidate to the Panel that it seeks to create. In 
addition, the Project provides some guidance on severance. We 
turn to these proposals now. 
A. The Standard for Consolidation 
Until now, consolidation has operated without any carefixl- 
ly articulated statutory or rule-based standards, relying instead 
on ad hoc judgments by individual judges or by the Judicial 
Panel on Multidistrict Litigation. But ever since discussion of 
expanding consolidation began a decade ago, proponents of 
reforrn have recognized that they do not want to create "a legal 
vacuum cleaner to suck all parties into a single federal court 
regardless of the  consequence^."'^^ 
The problem lies in providing sensible constraints. Buried 
in Appendix B of the ALI Project, which contains a Reporters' 
Study outlining a proposed interstate compact for consolidation 
of cases pending in the courts of various states, is an elegant 
comment that captures the difficulty confronting one who 
would fashion such constraints: 
Statisticians and epidemiologists describe and evaluate a 
test with reference to its "sensitivity" and "specificity." The 
probability that a positive test result will indicate the pres- 
ence of the characteristic being tested for is its sensitivity. 
Conversely, the probability that a negative test will indicate 
the absence of the characteristic being tested for is the test's 
specificity. The sensitivity and specificity of a test are a func- 
tion of the threshold for a positive test result. When that 
threshold is raised, there will be an increase in specificity and 
a decrease in sensitivity. Thus, by increasing the threshold for 
eligibility for consolidation, it is more likely that the cases 
that are selected for consolidation will be best suited for uni- 
tary treatment (an increase in specificity). At the same time, 
some cases that may have benefitted fkom unitary treatment 
will not be eligible for consolidation (a decrease in sensitivi- 
ty). log 
108. Thomas D. Rowe, Jr. & Kenneth D. Sibley, Beyond Diversity: Federal 
Multiparty, Multiforum Jurisdiction, 135 U.  PA. L. REV. 7, 17 (1986). 
109. COMPLEX LITIGATION PROPOSAL, supra note 3, at 467. 
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The problem confronting the framers of the Project was to find 
the best balance between sensitivity and specificity. 
One approach might be to adopt precise standards like 
Rule 42 in Wonderland. Other proposals to expand consolida- 
tion have relied on precise limits on the number of claimants or 
the dollar amount involved to provide a definite prerequisite for 
c~nsolidation.''~ On the floor of the American Law Institute as 
the Project came up for its final vote, Judge Jack Weinstein 
proposed that its provisions be conditioned on a similar prereq- 
uisite of 5,000 claimants with claims aggregating at  least $100 
million, but this proposal was defeated."' The omission of such 
a numerical prerequisite for consolidation is warranted. A pred- 
icate as high as the one proposed by Judge Weinstein could 
only rarely be satisfied, leaving the entire work product of the 
Project to sit on the shelf in all but the most extraordinary cas- 
es, and even then to come into play only after a great deal of 
other litigation activity. Even with class actions, which do have 
a numerosity prerequisite,112 the actual number necessary for 
class certification is uncertain and vastly below the number 
proposed by Judge Weinstein.'13 To adopt a numerical prerequi- 
site closer to the current multidistrict experience'" would mean 
that the numerical requirement would be so easily satisfied 
110. Thus, Professor Rowe and Mr. Sibley suggested that expanded federal 
jurisdiction for complex cases could be limited to cases involving a t  least 25 vic- 
tims. See Rowe & Sibley, supra note 108, a t  33, and Congress has considered stat- 
utes incorporating similar numerical limitations; see H.R. 3406, lOlst Cong., 2d 
Sess. 5 2(a) (requiring that at  least 25 natural persons be injured, each with dam- 
ages in excess of $50,000). 
111. See ALI Finishes Complex Litigation Project, Makes Progress on Various 
Restatements, 61 U.S.L.W. 2709, 2710 (1993). 
112. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(l) (allowing class actions only if class members 
are too numerous to be joined). 
113. See 7A CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, 
9 1762 (1986) (citing cases allowing class status with classes of 25, 35, 40 and 50 
members, but also citing cases that deny class certification on numerosity grounds 
for classes as large as 350). 
114. The ALI Project reports that the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation 
has almost always found the benefits of transfer were satisfied if there are more 
than five actions involved. COMPLEX LITIGATION PROPOSAL, supra note 3, a t  52; see 
also Note, The Judicial Panel and the Conduct of Multidistrict Litigation, 87 HARv. 
L. REV. 1001, 1009-10 (1974) (noting transfer is "almost certain . . . if more than 
five actions are involved"). 
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that it would place no significant restraint on » on solid at ion."^ 
Effective limitations must be sought elsewhere. 
The ALI Project goes well beyond any other codified set of 
consolidation guidelines in attempting to provide such limita- 
tions. Although this Article criticizes the vigor with which the 
Project constrains consolidation in its central provisions, i t  
should acknowledge that the Project's basic scheme appears 
wise and that the debate is about matters of implementation. 
The starting point is to recognize, as noted above,l16 that con- 
solidation and class action treatment "have increasingly been 
regarded as alternative, indeed possibly fungible, mechanisms 
for accomplishing aggregation."l17 The Project thus borrows 
overtly from Rule 23, the class action rule,118 but it also invokes 
the same transaction standard that is articulated in Rule 20 for 
permissive joinder of parties. 
The Project's varied standards apply to different circum- 
stances in which the Project proposes to authorize consolida- 
tion. The general standard for cases pending in federal court is 
embodied in section 3.01, which is a watered down version of 
Rule 23(b)(3). In contrast, the standard found in Reporters' 
Study in Appendix B, for consolidation pursuant to the novel 
proposed interstate compact, is a relatively direct adoption of 
the Rule 23(b)(3) standard for class certification. In between, 
section 5.01 articulates the standard for removal and adds a 
"same transaction" test to the common question standard that 
is embodied in section 3.01."~ These differences are justified on 
115. The Project explains in commentary that "exact dimensional criteria" were 
rejected in part because even when there are very few parties or cases, consolida- 
tion may be warranted due to complexity of the issues or volume of discovery, or 
to "avoid significant duplication of effort [for a] defendant." COMPLEX LITIGATION 
PROPOSAL, supra note 3, at  52-53. 
116. See supra text accompanying notes 32-38. 
117. Edward F. Sherman, Aggregate Disposition of Related Cases: The Policy 
Issues, 10 REV. LITIG. 231, 256 (1991). 
118. E.g., COMPLEX LITIGATION PROPOSAL, supra note 3, a t  49 ("A similar test 
is applied under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) . . . ."); id. at  117 ("The procedure for the 
severance of issues under Rule 23(c)(4) is similar to that under Rule 42(b)."); id. a t  
461 ("This standard is analogous to the criteria applied for class certification under 
Federal Rule 23(b)(3) . . . "). 
119. This description for the various consolidation criteria may prove confusing 
to some readers, so it seems wise to provide a schematic summary of the criteria 
employed in each of the three formats provided in the Project. As used below, 
"minimum commonality" means that the consolidation provision only requires that 
there be some common question. Similarly, "minimum superiority" means that the 
consolidation provision only requires that consolidation "promote the just, efficient, 
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the ground that jurisdiction and other factors extrinsic to the 
pure consolidation decision mandate different treatment.120 
Without focusing on the justifications offered for different treat- 
ment, this Article questions the departures from the Rule 
23(b)(3) model on the grounds (1) that the class action standard 
is sufficiently flexible for consolidation, and (2) that lowering 
the threshold below that standard would be unwise. 
Rule 23(b)(3) directs the court to certify a class only if it 
finds that common questions predominate and that a class 
action would be superior to other modes of adjudication. Cer- 
tainly the same basic approach could be utilized to bring con- 
solidation into parallel treatment with class actions. As the 
Reporters of the Project recognized in emulating Rule 23(b)(3) 
in Appendix B7 however, the class certification standard "is 
more demanding than that set forth in 28 U.S.C. 8 1407 and 
proposed [in section 3.01 of the Project] for the consolidation 
and transfer of lawsuits within the federal system."121 Sec- 
tion 3.01 requires only that there be one common question of 
fact and that transfer "promote the just, efficient and fair con- 
duct of the actions."'" Yet the commentary to section 3.01 be- 
gins with the following explanation: 
The underlying premise of the consolidation standard set 
forth in this section is that a series of related claims will not 
be transferred for consolidated treatment unless the parties 
and fair conduct of the actions," rather than directing that consolidation be ordered 
only if it would be superior to individual litigation in terms of those criteria. 
5 3.01 
predominance required superiority required not required 
I 
120. Thus, 5 5.01's addition of the same transaction requirement is justified on 
the ground that "this section acts as a jurisdiction, as well as a consolidation, 
mechanism." COMPLEX LITIGATION PROPOSAL, supra note 3, at 225. Similarly, the 
more stringent requirements of Appendix B are justified on the ground that com- 
bining cases from different state courts is more intrusive. 
121. Id. at 461. 








minimum minimum required 
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and the judicial system will realize a significant savings in 
time and resources . . . and those savings can be achieved in a 
manner that is fair to the litigants.lu 
In terms of both sensitivity and selectivity, the adoption of a 
full-fledged Rule 23(b)(3) standard for consolidation by the 
Reporters in Appendix B better serves these goals than the 
watered-down version in section 3.01. 
1. Predominance of common questions 
The Reporters label Rule 23(b)(3)'s requirement that com- 
mon questions predominate a "super-commonality" criterion 
that is "more demanding" than the requirement of section 3.01 
that there be a common question of fact.124 But the Reporters 
also recognize that predominance is "fairly specific and objec- 
t i ~ e , " ' ~ ~  and make forceful arguments in commentary to Ap- 
pendix B that underscore the usefulness of the predominance 
requirement in achieving the goals they set for sec- 
tion 3.01.'~~ Looking beyond the Project, it is useful to recall 
what the Reporters say in their treatise on federal practice 
about the Rule 23(b)(3) predominance requirement: 
[Tlhe predominance test really involves an attempt to achieve 
a balance between the value of allowing individual actions to 
be instituted so that each person can protect his own interests 
and the economy that can be achieved by allowing a multiple 
party dispute to be resolved on a class action basis."' 
123. Id. at 38-39. 
124. Id. at 463. 
125. Id. at 462. 
126. In explaining their use of the predominance standard in Appendix B, the 
Reporters state: 
[A] high threshold ensures a substantial overlap of claims or issues so 
that the costs to the system and the parties of consolidation and manage- 
ment will not outweigh the costs of allowing the cases to remain dis- 
persed. . . . [Tlhe requirement that common questions predominate serves 
as a fairness safeguard, ensuring that claims or issues bearing no relation 
to each other will not be gathered together. Treating dissimilar cases 
alike would be as unfair as treating similar cases differently. 
Id. at 463-64. 
127. 7A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 113, 8 1777, at 518-19. Two of the authors 
of this treatise, Arthur R. Miller and Mary Kay Kane, were, respectively, Reporter 
and Associate Reporter of the COMPLEX LITIGATION PROPOSAL. 
906 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I995 
This sounds almost exactly like the goal the Reporters set for 
section 3.01.'~~ Moreover, there is some language in the com- 
mentary to section 3.01 itself that suggests that even under the 
proposed formulation of section 3.01, predominance should be 
important.12' Indeed, the recently released Manual for Complex 
Litigation, Third, cautions that "[u]nless common evidence 
predominates, consolidated trials may lead to jury confusion 
while failing to improve effi~iency."'~~ 
The sticking point, it seems, is the one the Reporters make 
in Appendix B-that the predominance standard is fairly spe- 
cific and objective.131 Much as that might seem a selling point 
to one concerned about controlling use of consolidation, the 
commentary to section 3.01 emphasizes that for cases in federal 
court section 3.01 allows "maximum discretion" to consolidate 
and thereby makes the commonality standard "so minimal" 
that it "rarely will be dispo~itive."'~~ The Reporters reason 
that a predominance requirement would create a risk that the 
standard would err on the side of specificity and unduly dimin- 
ish sensitivity, precluding consolidation in some cases where it 
should be employed.133 But experience under Rule 23 suggests 
that its predominance requirement has not hamstrung courts; 
there the courts have treated the predominance standard as 
satisfied if the common questions "represent a significant as- 
pect of the case and they can be resolved for all members of the 
class in a single adj~dication."'~~ They have not automatically 
interpreted "predominance" to mean "determinative" or even 
"signifi~ant."~~~ Even the Multidistrict Litigation Panel, op- 
128. See supra text accompanying note 123. 
129. "For example, the predominance of individual issues may suggest that 
consolidation will not promote justice or efficiency." COMPLEX LITIGATION PROPOSAL, 
supra note 3, at  45. Note that this commentary is directed toward the second cri- 
terion of 5 3.01, discussed infia in text accompanying notes 141-52. 
130. MANUAL, THIRD, supra note 32, 5 21.631. 
131. See supra text accompanying note 121. 
132. COMPLEX LITIGATION PROPOSAL, supra note 3, at  43. 
133. The commentary explains: 
A more restrictive standard, such as "predominance of common questions," 
is less desirable because situations might arise in which substantial bene- 
fits could be gained by transfer for consolidation even when only a single 
common factual question is present because it would avoid the duplication 
of effort that otherwise would result in resolving that issue in separate 
suits. 
Id. 
134. 7A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 113, 5 1778, at 528. 
135. Id. a t  528-29. 
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erating under a statute with a minimal commonality require- 
ment, has sometimes used predominance as a criterion for 
transfer,ls6 and predominance has also been invoked in Rule 
42 consolidation decisions. ls7 
Other cases handled by the Multidistrict Litigation Panel 
provide grounds for uneasiness about a minimalist approach to 
commonality. That Panel rarely makes the common question 
requirement determinative,ls8 but "simply identifies the com- 
mon questions that exist and orders transfer without analyzing 
their relation to the overall litigation to any great degree."139 
At least in some cases, the commonality found sufficient seems 
136. See, eg., In re Eli Lilly & Co. Oraflex Prod. Liab. Litig., 578 F. Supp. 
422, 423 (J.P.M.L. 1984) ("Although we recognize that the actions in this litigation 
involve some common questions of fact, we are not persuaded that these common 
questions of fact will, in the future course of this litigation, predominate over indi- 
vidual questions of fact . . . ."); In re Sears, Roebuck & Co. Employment Practices 
Litig., 487 F. Supp. 1362, 1364 (J.P.M.L. 1980) ("Individual rather than common 
factual questions predominate regarding the liability aspects of the five actions be- 
fore us," and the common factual questions do not "overcome the overall predomi- 
nance of individual factual questions . . . ."); In re Airline "Age of Employee" Em- 
ployment Practices Litig., 483 F. Supp. 814, 814 (J.P.M.L. 1980) (denying transfer 
after district court rejected motion to consolidate under Rule 42 because common 
questions do not predominate); In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Employment 
Discrim. Litig., 438 F. Supp. 937, 939 (J.P.M.L. 1977) ("[I]ndividual rather than 
common factual questions predominate in this litigation."); In re Asbestos and As- 
bestos Insulation Material Prod. Liab. Litig., 431 F. Supp. 906, 910 (J.P.M.L. 1977) 
("Many factual questions unique to each action or to a group of actions already 
pending in a single district clearly predominate, and therefore transfer is unwar- 
ranted."); In re King Resources Co. Sec. Litig., 342 F. Supp. 1179, 1183 (J.P.M.L. 
1972) (noting that parties have argued convincingly that common issues do not 
predominate); see also In re "The Exorcist" Copyright Infringement Litig., 411 F. 
Supp. 793, 793-94 (J.P.M.L. 1976) (rejecting argument that common questions do 
not predominate). 
137. See Close v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc., 1994 WL 761957, at  *3 
(D.N.H. 1994) ("On the basis of the record before it, the court finds that the plain- 
tiffs have not met their burden of showing that a Rule 42(a) consolidation is ap- 
propriate here. . . . [Blecause individual issues in the civil actions predominate 
over common issues, separate depositions, interrogatories, and requests for docu- 
ments will be more beneficial to plaintiffs than consolidated discovery."); Scardino 
v. Amalgamated Bank, 1994 WL 408180, a t  *2 (E.D. Pa. 1994) ("Although there 
are common questions of law or fact in both actions as to the validity of the note 
and mortgage, these questions are not sufficiently predominant in this action to 
warrant consolidation."); Maruzen I d 1  Co., Ltd. v. Bridgeport Merchandise, Inc., 
1991 WL 130170, a t  *1 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (ordering consolidation because common 
questions predominate); Henderson v. National R.R. Passenger Corp. 118 F.R.D. 
440, 441 (N.D. 111. 1987) ("Although certain common issues of fact may exist in 
both actions, the variety of individual issues predominate."). 
138. But see cases cited supra note 136. 
139. 15 WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, 8 3863, a t  515 (2d 
ed. 1986). 
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almost nonexistent. For example, in In re Aviation Products 
Liability ~itigation'~' the Panel was presented with a series of 
cases pending in districts in seven states and involving mal- 
functioning helicopter engines. The helicopters in question were 
made by two different manufacturers, and the claims were 
quite disparate. A number of the cases presented claims by 
corporate helicopter owners for damages to the helicopters and 
their businesses due to malfimctioning of the engines. Other 
cases involved personal injury claims by people injured in heli- 
copter crashes. Still other cases involved claims that the heli- 
copter frames had been improperly designed and that certain 
helicopters had not been properly maintained. The only link 
among the cases was that each helicopter had the same make 
of engine, although different components of that engine were 
cited as responsible for different incidents. Despite vigorous 
opposition from many parties, the Panel ordered transfer, rea- 
soning that "although the specific defects alleged in each sepa- 
rate case may not be identical they are all interwoven so as to 
cover the engine's general condition and airw~rthiness."'~~ 
It may be that the Panel's action in Aviation Products was 
appropriate since the consolidation there was purely pretrial. 
But if the ALI Project's goal in requiring only minimal com- 
monality is to facilitate consolidation in cases like Aviation 
~ r o d u c t s , ' ~ ~  the predominance requirement seems an important 
140. 347 F. Supp. 1401 (J.P.M.L. 1972). 
141. Id. at  1402. 
142. This case was not unique in the annals of the Panel. In In re Multi-piece 
Rim Products Liability Litigation, 464 F. Supp. 969 (J.P.M.L. 1979), the Panel 
transferred 19 actions brought in 14 different districts to recover for injuries relat- 
ed to the failure of multipiece truck wheels. These products were manufactured by 
four different companies, a t  least one of which was sued in each case, and 21 
other defendants were named in the actions, but 19 of these were named in only 
one case. Id. at  971. Opponents to the transfer, including plaintiffs in five of the 
actions and all defendants but one, emphasized that each case involved unique 
facts. The Panel nevertheless ordered transfer based on the parties' theory that all 
of the products were "essentially the same, for purposes of this litigation, because 
they all operate on the same engineering principle." Id. at  974. 
Similarly, in In re Multidistrict Commodity Credit Corp. Litig. Involving Grain 
Shipments, 300 F. Supp. 1402 (J.P.M.L. 1969), 32 separate claims were made 
against a variety of railroad companies for alleged losses of grain during shipment. 
Different kinds of grain were involved in different shipments, but all were in cov- 
ered hopper cars. Although each claim would turn on the individual circumstances 
involved in that shipment, the Panel found common questions regarding "general 
standards for loading and unloading hopper cars, general standards for weighing 
hopper cars, the integrity of the hopper cars by design and manufacture and the 
amount of shrinkage or loss of moisture which normally occurs in these grains." Id. 
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limitation.'" In essence, the Project's rejoinder appears to be 
that the primary protection against improper consolidation in 
section 3.01 is provided by the other element of its test, which 
directs that consolidation be ordered only where it "will pro- 
mote the just, efficient, and fair conduct of the actions."'" 
But that prong of section 3.01 also omits an important directive 
that the Reporters included in Appendix B-that consolidation 
of the cases be "superior to their separate adjudi~ation."'~~ 
2. Superiority 
The superiority requirement also comes from Rule 23(b)(3) 
and also appears well-crafted to ensure that consolidation is 
used only when it is appropriate. Here again, the difference 
between section 3.01 and Appendix B appears to be designed to 
emphasize the Project's resolve that a more demanding stan- 
dard be met before consolidation is effected only in situations 
governed by Appendix B." This has resulted in an unneces- 
sary watering down of the standard for consolidation within the 
federal system. Rule 23(b)(3)'s superiority requirement does not 
impose undue burdens. Instead, the requirement only directs 
the court to verify that a class action would be "sufficiently 
effective to justify the expenditure of the judicial time and 
energy that is necessary to adjudicate a class action and to 
assume the risk of prejudice to the rights of those who are not 
directly before the court."147 The commentary on section 3.01 
suggests that section 3.01 is designed to ensure that courts 
follow the same analysis before approving  ons solid at ion,'^^ and 
it may be essential to upgrade the black letter of section 3.01 to 
avoid making the consolidation standard spineless. 
As Professor Brunet has cogently noted, there is a perva- 
sive tendency for efficiency to trump competing policies in ag- 
gregation decisions,'" and a spineless consolidation standard 
at 1404. 
143. Cf: Note, supra note 114, at 1016 (characterizing Aviation Products as a 
questionable use of the Panel's transfer power). 
144. COMPLEX LITIGATION PROPOSAL, supra note 3, 8 3.01(a)(2), at 37. 
145. Id., app. B, 8 l(a)(2). 
146. Thus the Reporters are able to note in Appendix B that %]he inclusion of 
a superiority requirement is more demanding than the standard proposed for feder- 
al intrasystem consolidation. Compare 4 3.01(a)(2)." Id. at 464. 
147. 7A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 113, 8 1779, at 552. 
148. See supra text accompanying note 123. 
149. See Edward Brunet, The Triumph of Efficiency and Discretion Over Com- 
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enables judges to succumb to that tendency. The experience of 
the current Multidistrict Litigation Panel provides substantial 
evidence to support this concern and should give Congress 
pause when it evaluates section 3.01. As originally proposed to 
Congress by the judiciary, the multidistrict transfer statute did 
not even call for attention to party interests in the decision 
whether to transfer, but Congress inserted party interests as a 
criterion under the Act.lS0 Nevertheless, it seems to be general- 
ly recognized that party interests have not been given signifi- 
cant weight by the current Panel,'" and one commentator has 
accused the Panel of "failure to heed this congressional admon- 
i~hrnent." '~~ 
Whatever the propriety of disregarding party interests 
when transfer is ostensibly for pretrial purposes only, the prac- 
%ice seems contrary to what the Project says it is doing in creat- 
ing authority for the new Complex Litigation Panel to consoli- 
date for trial. The factors that govern transfer under sec- 
tion 3.01 clearly include party  interest^,'^^ and the Project's 
commentary takes account of such interests as well.'" In order 
peting Complex Litigation Policies, 10 REV. LITIG. 273 (1991). 
150. See 28 U.S.C. 9 1407(a) (1988) (allowing transfer if it "will be for the 
convenience of parties and witnesses"). 
151. Wilson W. Herndon & Ernest R. Higginbotharn, Complex Multidistrict Liti- 
gation-An Overview of 28 U.S.C.A. $ 1407, 31 BAYLOR L. REV. 33, 43 (1979) 
("[Tlhe Panel has largely eliminated this guideline as a determinative standard."); 
Note, supra note 114, a t  1001, 1003 (1974) ("Once a threshold level of potential 
savings [of time and effort for judges] is found, however, transfer is almost inevita- 
ble."). 
152. Blake M. Rhodes, Comment, The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litiga- 
tion: Time for Rethinking, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 711, 720 (1991). 
153. Section 3.01(b)(2) says one factor "to be considered" is whether "consoli- 
dation can be accomplished in a way that is fair to the parties and does not result 
in undue inconvenience to them and the witnesses." COMPLEX LITIGATION 
PROPOSAL, supra note 3, 8 3.01(b)(2), a t  38. 
154. E.g., COMPLEX LITIGATION PROPOSAL, supra note 3, a t  44. According to 
that commentary: 
Id. 
The just and fair resolution of the actions requires a recognition that 
intrusion on party autonomy and control can be justified only when there 
is some reason to treat the underlying cases in a coordinated fash- 
ion . . . . Consolidation may be ordered only if it will serve fairness and 
efficiency goals better than allowing the cases to remain dispersed. A 
party's desire to exercise individual control over the prosecution or de- 
fense of a lawsuit, for instance, is a long recognized, but intangible, inter- 
est. 
a t  51. 
Because the proposed standard promotes consolidation for trial as well as 
pretrial, the convenience of the parties and the witnesses must be accord- 
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to put teeth into the commitment to party interests, a supe- 
riority requirement is preferable. Whether a superiority re- 
quirement would be sufficient remains debatable. Although the 
Project does recognize party interests, i t  also emphasizes in the 
commentary to section 3.01 that "the decision whether to trans- 
fer and consolidate remains dis~retionary,"'~~ using language 
virtually identical to the commentary to Appendix B,lS6 which 
does require a finding of superiority. Ultimately some discre- 
tion seems inevitable for, as Professor Brunet has noted, both 
fairness and efficiency are multifaceted con~epts?~ But if Ap- 
pendix B really is to be as elastic as section 3.01, there is rea- 
son to suspect that it is not sufficiently strict. 
One step toward confining the latitude is, as mentioned 
above, to require predominance of common questions as a pre- 
requisite to consolidation. Additionally insisting on a finding of 
superiority, and treating that as a serious requisite, appears a 
further positive step. In essence the superiority reasoning calls 
for the court to examine the pros and cons of consolidating the 
cases or leaving them to proceed separately. Although by no 
means a straightjacket, the balancing can be considerably more 
than a meaningless exercise. Consolidation need not be denied 
merely because the consolidated action would be ungainly or 
hard to manage, but consolidation must be justified by findings 
based on an actual comparison between consolidated and indi- 
vidual handling of the litigation. Such a comparison gives effect 
to the Project's objective that consolidation only occur when it  
actually is preferable to individual litigation. More precise 
requirements on the superiority prong are probably undesir- 
able. The Project itself examines a variety of considerations, 
and there will be instances in which some of these favor consol- 
idation while others do not. In such circumstances, it will be up 
ed more careful consideration than would be the case if transfer and 
consolidation were limited to the pretrial proceedings. 
Id. at  51. 
155. Id. a t  52. 
156. See id. at  469. 
157. Brunet, supra note 149, at 275-76 (footnote omitted). A tension between 
efficiency and fairness clearly exists, but the precise nature of that tension defies a 
simple, satisfactory definition because both terms incorporate many concepts. Effi- 
ciency is a vague idea having numerous meanings both generally and as applied to 
complex litigation. Similarly, the meaning of fairness may range from an autono- 
mous right to a single trial without cooperating with any co-parties to a seemingly 
contradictory right to intervene in a complex case initiated by another in order to 
protect one's interests. Id. 
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to the Panel to balance the various factors and decide whether 
to consolidate. 
3. Same transaction 
The Project's consolidation standard offers yet another 
wrinkle in section 5.01, which proposes a new removal jurisdic- 
tion that would allow the Panel to combine cases pending in 
state court with cases pending in federal court. Besides invok- 
ing the standard of section 3.01 and requiring "consideration of 
whether removal will unduly disrupt or impinge upon state 
court or regulatory proceedings," section 5.0 1 removal is avail- 
able only if the state cases "arise from the same transaction, 
occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences" as the 
cases pending in federal court.'" It appears that the same 
transaction provision, which is similar to that in Federal Rule 
20(a), was added because there is a jurisdictional aspect to 
section 5.01.'" But the operation of the Rule 20 provision tends 
to devolve into a variant of the commonality principle.160 Al- 
though consolidation based on common question is said to be 
broader than joinder under Rule 20,'~' and the commentary to 
the Project strives valiantly to show that the same transaction 
test is an important addition to section 5.01,'~' the Reporters' 
Notes acknowledge that situations will rarely satisfy the com- 
monality prong but fail to satisfjr the same transaction test as 
well. 
158. COMPLEX LITIGATION PROPOSAL, supra note 3, 5 5.01(a), at  220-21. 
159. See id. at 225. 
160. Thus, an oft-cited formulation of the Rule 20 same transaction inquiry is 
Judge Aldrich's explanation in Eastern Fireproofing Co. v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 160 F. 
Supp. 580, 581 (D. Mass. 1958): "[Tlhere can be no hard and fast rule, and . . . 
the approach must be the general one of whether there are enough ultimate factu- 
al concurrences that it would be fair to the parties to require them to defend 
jointly [the several claims] against them . . . ." 
161. See 9 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 24, 5 2382, at 432-33. 
162. See COMPLEX LITIGATION PROPOSAL, supra note 3, at 225-27. For example, 
the commentary cites Stanford v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 18 F.R.D. 152 (M.D. 
Tern. 1955), seemingly as an example of a case involving what the Project views 
as "distinct occurrences" that would not satisfy the same transaction test even 
though they involve common fact issues. Id. at 226. I t  is true that the court so 
ruled in that case, but in his treatise on federal practice Professor Miller, one of 
the Reporters on the COMPLEX LITIGATION PROPOSAL, says of this case that "the 
holding that joinder was improper seems quite doubtful." 9 WRIGHT & MILLER, 
supra note 24, 5 2382, at  433 n.14. Thus the Reporters' own example reinforces 
the conclusion that the same transaction test really adds nothing. 
163. COMPLEX LITIGATION PROPOSAL, supra note 3, at  228. 
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4. A reprise on the standard 
Despite endorsing full-fledged invocation of both the pre- 
dominance and superiority standards borrowed from Rule 
23(b)(3), this section should end with a recognition of the im- 
portance of the Project's contribution to resolving the consolida- 
tion conundrum. In an aggressively standardless area, the 
Project has provided an analytical format that identifies and is 
sensitive to the competing considerations. In order to ensure 
that the overall standard in fact constrains consolidation deci- 
sions, it would be better to fortify it to equal the one in Appen- 
dix B. But any sensible standard will have significant flexibili- 
ty. The recommended one would be neither self-executing nor 
scalpel-like. 
B. The Panel as Implementor 
Besides articulating a standard for consolidation, the Pro- 
ject seeks to regulate its use by assigning primary, or at  least 
initial, authority for the consolidation decision to the Complex 
Litigation Panel it proposes to establish? This sort of expand- 
ed authority to consolidate for trial has been proposed in the 
past for the current Multidistrict Litigation and it 
seems clearly preferable to the alternatives of conferring the 
authority entirely on the transferor or transferee judge, or 
leaving it to the parties' preferen~es. '~~ Placing consolidation 
authority in the Complex Litigation Panel would mark a 
change from the current arrangement in which transferee judg- 
es often exercise such authority under the guise of 28 U.S.C. 
8 1404(a). Reliance on the Panel would foster consistency in 
handling consolidation and ensure that judges fully familiar 
with the Project's textured consolidation standard would, a t  
least initially, make the decision whether that standard is 
satisfied. 167 
164. For consolidation pursuant to Appendix B, the Reporters propose creation 
of an Interstate Complex Litigation Panel of state judges. See COMPLEX LITIGATION 
PROJECT, supra note 3, app. B, 5 2(a). Although this would be a different entity, 
the nature of the constraint provided by centralization of authority would be simi- 
lar. Accordingly, this wrinkle is not treated separately in the text. 
165. See Fthodes, supra note 152, a t  712; Cooney, supra note 28, a t  611. 
166. See COMPLEX LITIGATION PROPOSAL, supra note 3, a t  64-66. 
167. See id. a t  63 (stating that the Panel would develop "a unique competence" 
to make this decision, and its involvement would promote predictability). 
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Sensible though it is, relying on the Panel to decide consol- 
idation issues is not a cure-all for the difficulties that attend 
consolidation. To begin with, timing creates a serious problem 
for the Panel. For good reasons, the Panel's decision whether to 
consolidate should ordinarily be made as early as p0ssib1e.l~~ 
But at  that time there may be significant uncertainty about 
critical aspects of the litigation that bear on the wisdom of 
consolidation, so that the Panel will have to rely on an in- 
formed guess. The Project's commentary suggests that the 
Panel can delegate fact-gathering responsibility to a "special 
master" if it does not know enough about the cases,16' but 
this option would rarely be helpful since it would only delay 
matters. At least one piece of information that is often impor- 
tant-the law to be applied-will by definition be unavailable 
to the Panel when its consolidation decision must be made. The 
Project authorizes the transferee judge to select governing 
principles of law in some  circumstance^,'^^ but of necessity that 
decision can only be made after transfer. The choice of law 
decision could, however, have a significant bearing on whether 
there are common questions, and whether those predominate. 
More generally, owing to the need to adjust the nature of con- 
solidation in the face of later developments, or to undo 
consolidation entirely, the transferee judge has authority to 
reconsider or revise a consolidation order of the Panel.l7' 
Hence, although the Panel should be a better arbiter, it cannot 
be a final arbiter, and considerable power must continue to re- 
side in the transferee judge. 
In addition, there is room for skepticism about the enthusi- 
asm the Panel will bring to some of the consolidation criteria, 
particularly those that deal with fairness and litigant interests. 
As noted above, the current Multidistrict Panel has been nota- 
bly indifferent to Congress' insistence that litigants' interests 
be a coequal factor in making transfer decision for pretrial 
purposes.172 Perhaps there is something in the implicit mission 
168. Id. 5 3.03(a) (stating that the panel should decide on consolidation "as 
soon as possiblen so that parties and court know whether it will occur). 
169. Id. at 68. 
170. See id. $5 6.01-.08, at 321-436. 
171. Id. at 108. Whether a transferee judge could use 5 1404(a) to effect con- 
solidation for trial where the Panel had determined that such consolidation should 
not occur presents a nice question. It is not clear that such an order would be 
subject to review by the Panel under section 3.07(b). 
172. See supra text accompanying notes 151-52. 
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statement for the Panel that accelerates the tendency Professor 
Brunet notes to exalt efficiency over litigant interests and other 
considerations. A Chief Justice may be expected to select 
judges for such a Panel who support the idea of aggregated 
treatment, or at least to pass over judges who are distinctly 
skeptical about it (if any still exist). The dynamics of the Panel 
itself may tend to reinforce this likely initial preference for 
aggregation. Hence, although the Panel would have a "national 
focus and overview" that would put it in an "optimal position to 
consider the interests of the entire judicial system,"'" it is 
less clear that the Panel would be "relatively neutral in making 
the transfer for consolidation deci~ion.""~ To the contrary, al- 
though the Panel might be expected to approach the selection 
of a transferee district neutrally, it would probably have a dis- 
tinct bent in favor of transfer. A transferee judge may similarly 
approach the transfer/consolidation question with indifference 
to party  interest^.'^^ 
In sum, the fact that consolidation decisions are initially to 
be made by the Complex Litigation Panel does not substantial- 
ly lessen the need to fortify the standard for consolidation, as 
urged above. Particularly given the experience under the cur- 
rent Multidistrict Litigation Panel, a clear declaration of the 
prerequisites to transfer is in order. 
C. Fragmentation of Cases 
The natural tendency of consolidation toward bifurcation, 
trifurcation, and beyond would be further fueled were the 
Project's proposals adopted. The Project's black letter suggests 
that the transferee judge consider "structuring of the litigation 
by separating the issues into those common questions that 
should be treated on a consolidated basis and those individual 
questions that should not."'77 The Project further directs that 
173. See supra text accompanying note 149. 
174. COMPLEX LITIGATION PROPOSAL, supra note 3, at 62. 
175. Id. 
176. "The concept of 'convenience of parties and witnesses' takes on an entirely 
different meaning when a 8 1404(a) motion, encompassing tens or hundreds of 
cases, is brought before a 8 1407 transferee court. In such a setting, the interests 
of the individual litigants are subordinated to the collective good." Rhodes, supra 
note 152, at 741. 
177. COMPLEX LITIGATION PROPOSAL, supra note 3, 8 3.06(a), at 106. Compa- 
rable authority is proposed in the Reporters' Appendix B for the transferee state 
judge who receives cases transferred by the Interstate Complex Litigation Panel. 
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the transferee judge prepare a plan for the disposition of the 
litigation that "shall specify whether the entire action or only 
specified issues shall be determined in the transferee district 
and also shall provide for the disposition of the issues not to be 
determined in the transferee court."178 To implement this tri- 
al plan, the judge has "broad discretion" to return "individual 
issues" to the court from which the case originated or to trans- 
fer them to yet another transferee district.17g When cases are 
removed from state court pursuant to the Project's new removal 
jurisdiction, this power to decide which issues will be consoli- 
dated for trial could lead to issues in the same case being re- 
solved in different court systems.180 As we have seen, such 
fragmented litigation is not cost free.181 But since bifurcation is 
more a by-product than the primary goal of the Project, it will 
not be examined in detail here. 
The starting point in assessing the bifurcation issue is to 
recognize that, despite the rather longstanding debate about 
the desirability of bifurcation under Rule 42(b), there has been 
rather little direction on when bifurcation should be em- 
ployed.la2 The Project does not stop at  creating expanded au- 
thority to fragment cases, however; it also provides a detailed 
analysis of the issues bearing on the use of the severance pow- 
er that is unequalled in any similar source. The commentary 
identifies and addresses several important problems and sup- 
plies guidance on dealing with these issues even for those who 
disagree with the Project's position on some of the problems. 
Although the best way to obtain insight into the severance 
issues addressed is to read the pertinent portions of the Pro- 
ject, a canvass here identifies the matters covered. 
First, the Project categorizes and chronicles the types of 
issues that might usefully be severed according to case type. 
For example, it identifies four determinations that need to be 
made in "antitrust, securities, products liability and mass di- 
saster litigation," suggesting that general causation and liabili- 
See id. app. B, 5 6(a). 
178. Id. 5 3.06(b), at 106. 
179. Id. 5 3.06(c), at 106. 
180. "Section 5.01tc) . . . contemplates intersystem rather than intrasystem bi- 
furcation of a single case before one court." Id. at 237. 
181. See supra text accompanying notes 47-84. 
182. See Henderson et al., supra note 72, at 1684 ("[Olnly very vague stan- 
dards exist for determining the appropriateness of a judge's decision to hold a 
bifurcated trial."). 
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ty can often be separated from specific causation and damag- 
es.lg3 It offers similar analyses of copyright, patent and contract 
litigati~nl*~ and supports consolidation of punitive damages? 
It also offers guidance on whether the transferee court should 
retain or transfer individual issues after severing them .Ig6 
Second, the Project recognizes that severance conflicts with 
the tradition of a unitary trial and insists that this conse- 
quence of severance be considered before the procedure is em- 
ployed.lg7 But it properly goes on to note that the principal 
problem area for severance is in personal injury litigation and 
that "[ilssue severance has operated without any real problem 
or challenge in the securities and antitrust fields."lg8 In the 
same vein, the Project identifies the prodefendant shift in re- 
sults that seems to attend bifurcation between liability and 
damages in personal injury caseslg9 and recognizes that there is 
an "important philosophical issue"1g0 about whether the breed 
of jury nullification of liability rules that seems to occur in  
unitary trials should be fostered. The Reporters' Notes suggest 
that, at  least in complex litigation, there is no alternative to 
severance despite the nullification effect.lgl 
Third, the Project identifies the sterile trial problem and 
explores the Sixth Circuit's grappling with that problem.192 I t  
suggests that allowing plaintiffs to introduce some evidence of 
their injuries during the liability portion of the trial could ame- 
liorate the sterile trial problem, although this strategy will not 
entirely eliminate the problem.lg3 Conceding that the cure is 
183. COMPLEX LITIGATION PROPOSAL, supra note 3, at  114. 
184. Id. at  114-15. 
185. Id. at  115. The justification for this position seems essentially substan- 
tive-to avoid crippling multiple punitive damage awards against defendants. 
186. Id. at  126. For example, i t  observes that "damage issues that are linked 
inextricably to factual determinations already made in the magnet court sometimes 
may benefit from being handled by the transferee judge." Id. 
187. "[Ilssue severance . . . must be undertaken with great care in recognition 
that it alters the tradition of how cases are decided. Before a court adopts the pro- 
cedure in a particular case, the possible effects severance may have on the pro- 
ceedings must be considered." Id. a t  119-20. For a discussion of these issues, see 
Richard L. Marcus, Completing Equity's Conquest? Reflections on the Future of 
Trial Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 50 U.  Prm. L. REV. 725 (1989). 
188. COMPLEX LITIGATION PROPOSAL, supra note 3, at  120. 
189. Id. at  120-21; see supra text accompanying note 82. 
190. COMPLEX LITIGATION PROPOSAL, supra note 3, at  120. 
191. Id. at  125. 
192. Id. at  121-23; see supra text accompanying notes 73-81. 
193. COMPLEX LITIGATION PROPOSAL, supra note 3, at  122. 
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incomplete, the Project nevertheless recommends bifurcation 
because the advantages are likely to outweigh the disadvantag- 
es, and because "judicious use of separate trials is essential to 
the effective functioning of the jury system."lg4 But it cau- 
tions that "trifurcation is more questionable than bifurca- 
tion."lg5 
Fourth, it argues that severance will actually improve the 
fairness of consolidated proceedings by preserving the plaintiffs' 
control over litigation of individual issues. lg6 Of course, sever- 
ance does involve the left hand giving back some of what the 
right hand took away, since consolidation caused the loss of 
control in the first place. Moreover, this restoration of control 
may be less significant than the Project suggests unless accom- 
panied by a return of the case to the original court, where the 
lawyers initially retained by the plaintiffs can more convenient- 
ly participate. 
Fifth, the Project offers some commonsense tips on employ- 
ing severance. Thus, it suggests that putting simple issues first 
may avoid undue expense if more cumbersome issues can 
thereby be avoided.lg7 It also suggests that the "judge may 
empanel multiple juries to see whether" they reach conflicting 
outcomes in order to protect against the possibility of an anom- 
alous verdict. lg8 
Finally, the Project proposes to create special appellate 
avenues to provide early review of certain aspects of severed 
proceedings, recognizing that special treatment should be ac- 
corded severance orders. It would authorize the Complex Liti- 
gation Panel to review the transferee judge's orders to transfer 
issues.199 Although the Panel's authority does not extend to all 
severance decisions made by the transferee judge:' the very 
existence of review authority recognizes the special impact that 
194. Id. at 123. 
195. Id. at 122. 
196. See id. at 109 ("[Alllowing for consolidation of issues rather than entire 
claims increases the possibility that the individual litigant will be represented 
adequately . . . without sacrificing the ability of individual parties to control the 
litigation of unique issues."). 
197. Id. at 111. 
198. Id. at 123. 
199. Id. 8 3.07(b), at 129. The Panel would have discretion not to undertake 
such review. 
200. See id. at 137 ("It does not embrace questions regarding possible prejudice 
or inefficiencies surrounding a decision to have a consolidated trial on a particular 
issue or to sever certain issues for individual treatment."). 
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severance decisions can have on cases.201 In addition to Panel 
review of certain severance orders, the Project would authorize 
immediate review of liability determinations by an appellate 
court when the question of liability has been separately adjudi- 
cated, even though damages issues remain to be 
Perhaps other, more precise guidelines for severance might 
be proposed.203 Certainly transferee judges will have significant 
latitude in shaping cases, and the Project's overall orientation 
is sympathetic to the use of transferee discretion. But the com- 
mentary does catalogue and take seriously the potential draw- 
backs, as well as offering some particulars such as the com- 
ment that trifircation is more dubious than bifur~ation.~'~ One 
idea that might help in the decision to bifurcate, as with the 
initial decision to consolidate,205 is superiority; the black letter 
could direct that bifurcation only be used if superior to unitary 
trial. In a consolidation situation, however, a superiority re- 
quirement in the bifurcation analysis would seem to add little 
to the superiority requisite in the consolidation itself, were that 
vigorously applied. Neither in Rule 42(b) nor elsewhere in pro- 
cedural law is there a source for borrowing guidelines on frag- 
mentation as there is in Rule 23(b)(3) for the question of con- 
s ~ l i d a t i o n . ~ ~ ~  Accordingly, despite concern about over-fragmen- 
201. As the commentary explains: 
The potential impact of those decisions warrants an opportunity for dis- 
cretionary review even though modification is possible. For example, plain- 
tiffs erroneously forced to remain for a consolidated trial in a distant 
forum may face prohibitive litigation costs, subordination of their individu- 
al claims or defenses, or undue delay. . . . Not only would increased costs 
pose a hardship to plaintiffs, but also they might affect the outcome of 
the litigation. Plaintiffs unable to bear the financial burden might feel 
obliged to settle for less than they otherwise might have secured. 
Id. a t  136. 
202. Id. 5 3.07(c), at  130. 
203. Henderson et al., supra note 72, a t  1694-95, propose that in mass tort 
cases bifurcation only be allowed when two conditions are satisfied: "First, any 
issue to be tried separately must be common to all of the claims. Second, the rele- 
vant societal interests must clearly outweigh the interests of individual claimants 
in . . . a single, unified proceeding." But this constraint on judicial decision-making 
does not seem particularly stronger than the prescription of the Project. 
204. See COMPLEX LITIGATION PROPOSAL, supra note 3, a t  122 ("[Tlrifurcation 
is more questionable than bifurcation."). 
205. See supra text accompanying notes 146-57. 
206. Indeed, the Rule 23 analogy tends, if anything, to undercut the con- 
straints this Article urges for consolidation and bifurcation. Rule 23(c)(4)(A) allows 
the court to certify a class only "with respect to particular issues," implicitly bifur- 
cating the claims of all class members thereby. Although this issue certification 
power seems to erode the predominance requirement of Rule 23(b)(3) by allowing 
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tation of cases, this Article does not propose fortifying the 
Project's provisions on bifurcation as it does urge for the consol- 
idation standard. 
D. The Question Before Congress 
By assessing the value of consolidation in dealing with 
complex litigation, this Article illuminates whether Congress 
should embrace the Project's effort to facilitate consolidation. 
Although it urges fortifjing the standard for consolidation by 
making that standard more directly parallel to the handling of 
class actions under Rule 23(b)(3), on balance the Article finds 
that the Project provides a thorough and balanced examination 
of the consolidation conundrum. Does that mean that Congress 
should embrace the Project's central goal of facilitating consoli- 
dation? 
The answer is uncertain. For one thing, there are a variety 
of federalism and other objections to the Project's proposals 
that other scholars have addressed. Beyond that, there is what 
might be called empirical uncertainty about consolidation itself. 
This Article has approached the question almost entirely on the 
doctrinal level. The issues raised by consolidation that were 
identified in Part 111,207 however, really cannot be quantified in 
a way susceptible to doctrinal pres~ription.'~~ The Project's 
approach is to identify the issues and propose consideration of 
them by the Panel and later by the transferee judge. Judges 
have an experiential basis for such determinations, but one 
might conclude that their information base is too limited, or 
that they are too likely to be seduced into disregarding any 
counterbalances against consolidation in their quest for effi- 
ciency and broad-gauge disposition of litigation. 
the judge to excise and disregard noncommon issues, we are told that certification 
of specific issues can be used even if there is only one common issue, and that i t  
should be used in such a circumstance rather than deny class certification. See 7B 
WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 113, $ 1790, a t  271, 276. The Project notes the simi- 
larity of issue severance under Rules 23(c)(4) and 42(b). See COMPLEX LITIGATION 
PROPOSAL, supra note 3, at  117. Were the attitude of severance rather than denial 
of aggregation borrowed for consolidation, the consequence might be a stronger 
push toward bifurcation than the Project endorses. 
207. See supra text accompanying notes 36-91. 
208. Compare quantifiable factors such as the amount in controversy in diver- 
sity cases. See 28 U.S.C. $ 1332(a) (discussing situations "where the matter in 
controversy exceeds the sum or value of $50,000"). 
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Under these circumstances, it may not be enough to point 
out that the Project's effort to overcome the obstacles to consoli- 
dation "hardly refled[s] focused consideration of the desirable 
scope of possible cons~lidation."~~~ Even arbitrary limits can 
look attractive when they confine a disquieting, unknown force. 
The Project has not dispelled all misgivings about aggressive 
use of consolidation and severance of issues. Indeed, to a sub- 
stantial extent the Project seems tempted to fall back on the 
argument not that consolidation is desirable, but that it is the 
only stopgap available to prevent chaos.210 That is hardly a 
positive argument for consolidation and may be insufficient to 
carry the day for the Project's aggressive reforms designed to 
make consolidation more readily available. 
V. THE ROLE OF THE PROJECT'S CONSOLIDATION PROVISIONS, 
ASSUMING CONGRESS DOES NOT ACT 
The ALI has not had great success in the past in prodding 
Congress into action. Its 1969 Study of the Division of Jurisdic- 
tion Between State and Federal Courts proposed a number of 
statutory changes, but none were enacted until the Federal 
Courts Study Committee recommended some of them in 
1990.~" Assuming that Congress responds to the Project as it 
did to the Study, one would not expect to see the jurisdictional 
and other innovations recommended by the Project enacted in 
the near future. These striking ideas about jurisdiction and 
choice of law will (as did the 1969 Study) serve principally as 
fodder for law school classes. Some, therefore, criticize the 
Project because it is directed only at  C~ngress .~ '~  
Relegation to law school curriculum need not be the fate of 
the Project's analysis of consolidation, however. Without any 
209. Rowe, supra note 105, at  327. 
210. E.g., Sherman, supra note 117, a t  236-37 ("If plaintiffs cannot get their 
individual cases tried, aggregation may offer the only realistic opportunity for judi- 
cial resolution short of settlement."). 
211. The Federal Courts Study Committee recommended that Congress amend 
the general venue statute, 28 U.S.C. 5 1391, (a) to place the then-current authori- 
zation of venue in the district "in which the claim arose" with language suggested 
by the ALI study and (b) to eliminate the disparities then allowed between federal 
cases based soley on diversity and other federal cases. See REPORT OF THE FEDER- 
AL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE, supra note 89, a t  94. Congress so amended 5 1391 
in 1990. 
212. "The Project . . . really poses a working agenda for only one 
group--Congress." Shreve, supra note 9, a t  1144. 
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further action by Congress, as we have seen,213 transfer and 
consolidation decisions are repeatedly and increasingly made, 
and related severance orders are often entered. That is the 
reason why the Federal Courts Study Committee also recom- 
mended in 1990 that guidelines for consolidation and bifurca- 
tion be pr~mulgated.~" Perhaps the Project can be used as a 
source of the kind of guidance for judges that the Committee 
desired. 
The ALI's work product has proved much more influential 
with judges than with Congress. Its restatements have proved 
enormously successful in influencing the law?l5 sometimes too 
much so in the view of some The restatements have 
become almost an art form that can serve as a vehicle for all 
purposes.217 Like the restatements, the Project may influence 
judges confronting consolidation decisions even though its juris- 
dictional and choice of law proposals have not been enacted.218 
One important influence would be on the members of the cur- 
rent Multidistrict Litigation Panel; in making their transfer 
decisions under the current statute they could find much of use 
in the Project's discussion of transfer and consolidation. Simi- 
larly, transferee judges could find in the Project exactly the 
sort of blueprint for handling consolidation and severance deci- 
sions that the Federal Courts Study Committee urged. Outside 
the transfer context altogether, the growing importance of con- 
213. See supra Part 11. 
214. See supra text accompanying notes 88-89. 
215. "As of March 1994, the ALI counted over 125,000 court citations to the 
restatements. United States Supreme Court Justices invoked the restatements in 
nine cases during the 1993-94 term. Judges in all fifty states have looked to 
them." Justice Shirley S. Abrahamson, Refreshing Institutional Memories: Wisconsin 
and the American Law Institute, Address at the University of Wisconsin Law School 
(Oct. 28, 19941, in 1995 WIS. L. REV. 1, 4-5 (footnote omitted). 
216. See, e.g., George L. Priest, The Invention of Enterprise Liability: A Critical 
History of the Intellectual Foundations of Modern Tort Law, 14 J .  LEGAL STUD. 
461, 511-18 (1985) (arguing that 5 402A of the Restatement (Second) of 
Torts--dealing with strict products liability-was insinuated into the restatement 
by a cabal of law professors); Paul A. Simmons, Government by an Unaccountable 
Private Non Profit Corporation, 10 N.Y.L. SCH. J .  HUM. RTS. 67, 97 (1992) (urging 
that "ALI publications should not be given precedential effect in any court proceed- 
ing unless or until the ALI has been democratized*). 
217. See, e.g., Gretchen Craft Rubin & Jamie G. Heller, Note, Restatement of 
Love (Tentative Draft.), 104 YACE L.J. 707 (1994). 
218. "Even if Congress does not enact it, the Proposed Final Draft will un- 
doubtedly influence judicial opinion for many years to come." Symeon C. 
Symeonides, The ALI's Complex Litigation Project: Commencing the National De- 
bate, 54 LA L. REV. 843, 844-45 (1994). 
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solidation and severance of issues provides a ready market for 
the learning offered by the Project. Unlike the 1969 study of 
federal jurisdiction, then, the Project may become a vital part 
of the litigation scene. 
Given this prospect, the diversity of consolidation stan- 
dards contained in the Project is particularly unfortunate. For 
one thing, the existence of three standards is simply confus- 
ing.219 More significant, however, is the fact that the Project 
principally relies on a watered-down shadow of Rule 23(b)(3)'s 
requirements. At least one may hope that judges will, as rec- 
ommended in this Article, actually embrace the more vigorous 
requirements of Appendix B when confronted with the question 
whether to consolidate cases for purposes of adjudication. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Complex litigation sometimes does seem to resemble Won- 
derland, but consolidation pursuant to Federal Rule 42 pres- 
ents many more challenges than Wonderland's Rule 42. This 
Article has tried to demonstrate that the ALI Complex Litiga- 
tion Project contains important insights on the proper use of 
consolidation while also criticizing the Project's unwillingness 
to tighten up the test for consolidation. Given the limited prob- 
ability that Congress will soon undertake the reforms the Pro- 
ject proposes to foster consolidation, we may hope that the 
ALI's work in directly confronting the consolidation conundrum 
will nevertheless serve to improve and focus the judiciary's use 
of consolidation in the future. 
To best flulfill that objective, however, the judiciary should 
embrace the more forcehl provisions of Appendix B rather than 
the open-textured directives of section 3.01. Whether judges 
might do so is, a t  best, uncertain. Not only does adherence to 
Appendix B exalt the commentary over the black letter, it also 
cuts against the judicial tendency to maximize the courts' dis- 
cretion. This temptation to expand discretion may even lead to 
relaxation of the provisions of Rule 23, from which this Article 
has borrowed to fortify the Project's proposals. The Advisory 
Committee on the Civil Rules has for several years been consid- 
ering changes in the class action rule that would make it more 
~~en- tex tu red .~~ '  If the committee's class action initiatives her- 
219. See supra note 119 (summarizing the differences in standard between 
5 3.01, 5 5.01, and app. B of the Project). 
220. For the text of one such proposal, and a critical analysis, see Robert G. 
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ald a general trend to relax constraints on aggregation, the 
prognosis for the Project as a device for confining and focusing 
the use of consolidation is poor indeed. We may hope that an- 
other course will prevail with regard to both class actions and 
consolidation. 
Bone, Rule 23 Redux: Empowering the Federal Class Action, 14 REV. LITIG. 79, 
109-112 (1994). 
